Without immigration, populations across all the Baltic Sea states shrink. What happens when demographic pressures push countries of previously and persistently high emigration to rethink their immigration policies?

In the Baltic Sea region, immigration still constitutes a largely unused resource for development and strengthened competitiveness. We have to start viewing human migration and mobility as the resources for welfare improvement that they have the potential to be. But in order to tap into this resource, it is crucial to manage the challenges associated with migration, mobility and integration.

This report captures a selection of some of the most thought-provoking expert contributions to the project “Migration as part of a policy for increased competitiveness” – a collaboration of think tanks and research institutes working with issues of migration and integration in the Baltic Sea region. In eleven chapters that reflect the wealth and range of knowledge that has been shared and discussed in the course of this project, the report covers themes such as multiculturalism, the dangers of austerity politics, and the Europeanisation of migration policy. It also gives an accessible overview of recent developments in migration and integration policy in the Baltic States, Sweden and Poland.

“I applaud this endeavour to promote cooperation and increased understanding of the Baltic Sea region’s migration and integration challenges and opportunities ahead.”

Jan Niessen, Director of the Migration Policy Group, Brussels

Edited by Anna Horgby and Veronica Nordlund
Immigration in Times of Emigration

Challenges and Opportunities of Migration and Mobility in the Baltic Sea Region

Edited by
Anna Horgby and Veronica Nordlund
The report is the result of a one year project funded by the Swedish Institute and carried out by the Stockholm-based think tank Global Utmaning (Global Challenge) in cooperation with partner organisations in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The content of this publication represents the views of its independent authors and does not in any way commit the institutions with which they may be associated.

Global Utmaning (Global Challenge) is an independent Swedish think tank that analyses problems and proposes solutions to global challenges in the fields of economics, climate and migration.

Birger Jarlsgatan 27
111 45 Stockholm
Sweden
+46-8-787 21 50
www.globalutmaning.se

Project coordination and editing: Lisa Pelling, Anna Horgby and Veronica Nordlund
Cover design, typesetting and print: Vulkan.se 2013

This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit purposes, without special permission from the copyright holder(s) provided acknowledgement of the source is made. No use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purpose, without the written permission of the copyright holder(s).

Copyright Global Utmaning and authors © September 2013
The Baltic countries and Poland share a long tradition of labour emigration. Today, demographic challenges have created a need for implementing policies to stimulate labour inflows. In this transition it is essential for the region to introduce policies that facilitate integration: policies that promote equal opportunities, rights and obligations and thereby enhance the convergence of societal outcomes between natives and immigrants.

Policy change, however, comes slowly. Legal integration is only a first step on a long path towards societal integration. Benchmarking policies according to European and international standards is crucial. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) produced by the Migration Policy Group provides a tool for such benchmarking by measuring and comparing integration policies in 31 countries in Europe and North America. Using 148 policy indicators the MIPEX creates a rich, multi-dimensional picture of migrants’ opportunities to participate in society by assessing governments’ commitment to integration. The MIPEX reveals whether all residents are guaranteed equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities, and demonstrates how countries can do better in creating the legal environment in which immigrants can contribute to a country’s well-being, where they have equal access to employment and education, live in security with their families, become active citizens and are protected against discrimination.

I was glad to be invited to present the MIPEX on behalf of the Migration Policy Group at the expert seminar on labour migration in the Baltic Sea region, held in Vilnius on the 24th of April as part of a series of seminars hosted within the project Migration as part of a policy for increased competitiveness.

The Stockholm-based think tank Global Challenge and its partner organizations in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, have with this project attempted to enhance their expertise on migration and integration in the Baltic Sea region. This is one of many initiatives that, taken together, contribute to a well-informed debate on migration, equality and diversity, as well as enhanced cooperation between different actors. The Baltic Sea region has much to benefit from mutual learning and dialogue in the migration and integration policy arena and I applaud this endeavour to promote cooperation and increased understanding of the Baltic Sea region’s migration and integration challenges and opportunities ahead.

Jan Niessen
Director of the Migration Policy Group, Brussels
In my neighbourhood in Stockholm, there is scaffolding outside virtually every house. On my street, you can constantly hear the sounds of construction workers who are busy renovating the facades, changing roofs or mending windows. It is typically migrant workers from Poland who work here. They are mostly men. Women are also migrating for work, but since they are mostly working in nursing or service occupations, they are less visible than their male counterparts.

Often, I just pass the construction workers, heading for my job, but during the past months they have incited me to think about how interconnected we are with the countries in the Baltic Sea. My concerns and questions are many.

What is the situation like for the foreign construction workers in Sweden? How are their working conditions? How do they manage to have a family life? How does migration affect our countries around the Baltic Sea? Do we gain from migration? Do the Baltic countries and Poland – who now experience immigration as well as emigration – gain from it?

I am happy to work at a think tank where I have been able to analyse a number of such questions. The mission of Global Challenge is precisely to investigate how to tackle our global challenges, and to develop policy responses that are socially, economically and ecologically sustainable. Obviously, when working with global migration issues it is important that we also find out how things look in our own region – the Baltic Sea region.

A little more than a year ago, Lisa Pelling, programme manager for migration at Global Challenge and I, decided to investigate whether other organizations and think tanks in the Baltic Sea Region were interested in examining the relation between migration and efforts to increase our region’s competitiveness. We found many organizations that showed interest in participating in such an effort. We applied for funding from the Swedish Institute and were awarded money in a one-year project, so-called seed money.

A year goes fast. A few weeks ago we held our final conference in Warsaw. This conference was the last in a series of expert conferences hosted in four different countries during the past year. Several prominent scholars and experts gathered to discuss both the economic benefits of migration, and social challenges connected with migration such as discrimination issues.

“Without migrant workers there will be no construction,” said Ville Klemens, Building and Wood Workers’ International’s (BWI) Sweden, highlighting the importance of immigration for the European labour markets.

Many interesting, intelligent and exciting ideas have been exchanged in the course of the previous conferences, in Stockholm, Tallinn, Vilnius and Warsaw. Personally, I appreciated both the opportunity to listen to the discussion on multicultural societies, and the opportunity to learn more about how the demographic challenge looks in the Baltic countries where emigration is large and populations are ageing.

Our project has come to an end for this time. I hope this final report may make the results of this project available to a wider audience and inspire similar joint projects in the Baltic Sea region. The idea is that our project will serve as seeding for future cooperation.

Last but not least. Thanks to our amazing partners demosEUROPA, the Institute of Social Policy at Warsaw University, the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS, the Latvian Red Cross, the Lithuanian Social Research Centre – Institute for Ethnic Studies, the Estonian Human Rights Centre and the Institute of Baltic Studies. Without your efforts we would not have had any project. You have arranged conferences, written summaries and produced financial reports with professional attitude and contagious joy. Thank you!
Jytte Guteland is project manager for Europe and Employment at Global Challenge, Stockholm. She has a master’s degree in economics from Södertörn University. Previously, she was the Chair of the Social Democratic Youth of Sweden (SSU), Sweden’s largest political youth organisation. Jytte Guteland has also been a political advisor to the Swedish minister of finance.
## CONTENT

1. Introduction and Summary – Immigration in times of emigration  
   *Anna Horgby and Veronica Nordlund*  
   1

2. A New Era in Integration Policies in Europe?  
   *Kristina Kallas*  
   5

3. Challenges of Integration: the Case of Latvia  
   *Iveta Kazoka*  
   9

4. Straight to the labour market, straight into society? On Swedish experiences with labour immigration and integration  
   *Lisa Pelling*  
   13

5. Migration, Austerity and New Challenges to Labour Markets in the Baltic/Nordic Region  
   *Prof. Charles Woolfson*  
   19

   *Vija Platačiūtė*  
   27

7. Liberal Immigration Policy? The Case of Ukrainian Workers on the Polish Labour Market  
   *Prof. Maciej Duszczyk*  
   33

8. Labour migration and migrant integration in the perspective of recent EU Policy developments  
   *Tadas Leoncikas*  
   37

9. Migration, labour market, integration – an NGO voice  
   *Kinga Wysienska*  
   43

10. Integration Policies and Acculturation in Estonian Society in the last two decades  
    *Aune Valk*  
    47

    *Anna Platonova*  
    51
The Baltic Sea region faces important demographic challenges that will affect the region’s future competitiveness. Europe at large is characterised by ageing populations and low birth rates, and in countries like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, demographic problems are further aggravated by large outflows of people of working age. Significant numbers of the young populations leave Poland and the Baltic states to work abroad, in Scandinavia and elsewhere. This poses great challenges to the economies and the societies concerned, putting states’ welfare systems under pressure and possibly hampering future economic development.

Immigration is no panacea against the negative consequences of ageing societies. However, true for all countries around the Baltic Sea is that increased immigration will have to be a part of the solution to meet the demographic challenges ahead. Traditionally emigration countries, the Baltic States and Poland are gradually having to take on a new role as countries of immigration.

In the Baltic Sea region, migration and mobility constitute still largely unused resources for development and strengthened competitiveness. In order to tap into this resource, it is key to manage the challenges associated with migration and mobility, such as ensuring social integration and good working conditions for migrants and managing the risk of increased ethnic tensions and xenophobia. High unemployment rates and social instability in many European Union member states today risk leading to protectionism and a reluctance to openness. Increased support for more restrictions on immigration Europe-wide is but one sign of such a trend. This is the contrary of what Europe needs.

It is important not to generalise and to acknowledge that the countries in the Baltic Sea region face diverse sets of circumstances in terms of demography, unemployment and economic growth. But we do, as emphasised by the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, face several common challenges that make common efforts toward increased connectedness and prosperity crucial. The challenges of migration and integration, but also the possibilities that increased migration and mobility bring, have been the focus of the seed project “Migration as a part of a policy for increased competitiveness”, funded by the Swedish Institute. The aim of the project has been to develop cooperation and foster dialogue between think tanks and research institutes working with migration and integration in the Baltic Sea region.

The participating organizations and institutions are Global Challenge from Sweden, demosEUROPA and the Institute of Social Policy at Warsaw University from Poland, the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS and the Latvian Red Cross from Latvia, Lithuanian Social Research Centre – Institute for Ethnic Studies from Lithuania, and the Estonian Human Rights Centre and the Institute of Baltic Studies from Estonia.

From December 2012 to June 2013, a series of workshops and seminars have taken place in the
countries of the partner organisations. A start-up conference and planning workshop was held in Stockholm on December 6–7, 2012, organised by Global Challenge. This was followed by an expert seminar in Tallinn, Estonia, organised by the Institute of Baltic Studies and the Estonian Human Rights Centre on February 25, 2013, with the theme “New era in integration policies in the Baltic Sea countries?” On April 25, 2013, the expert seminar “Labour migration in the Baltic Sea countries: Trends and Prospects” was held in Vilnius, Lithuania, organised by the Lithuanian Social Research Centre, the Nordic Council of Ministers Office in Lithuania, the Embassy of Sweden and the Committee on Social Affairs and Labour of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Finally, a final conference, organised by demosEUROPA – Center for European Strategy, the Institute of Social Policy of the University of Warsaw, and Norden Centrum, took place in Warsaw on June 27 with the theme “Migration, Integration, Europeanization – old and new challenges for policies and actors: The case of the Baltic States”.

In this report we have captured a selection of some of the most thought-provoking expert voices heard during the conferences in Stockholm, Vilnius, Tallinn and Warsaw, speaking on such diverse themes as multiculturalism, austerity politics, labour migration liberalisation and the Europeanisation of migration policy, and giving an overview of recent policy developments in Sweden, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The contributors have generously shared with us their knowledge and expertise, their views and policy proposals. The ten chapters that follow well reflect the wealth and range of knowledge that has been imparted, shared and discussed in the course of this project. With this report we endeavour to take this discussion out of the seminar halls and stimulate continued debate.

Multiculturalism was once seen as the solution to the challenges brought on by an increasingly globalised world, as well as the “right thing to do”. However, this perception changed with 9/11, the death of Theo Van Gogh and the Madrid bombings, and European leaders declared that multiculturalism had failed. But is this true? Or is it rather the policies that have failed? Kristina Kallas, Institute of Baltic Studies in Estonia, devotes the first chapter “Talk about Multiculturalism – A New Era in Integration Policies in Europe?” to this topic. Kallas argues that we are all multicultural and that multiculturalism is very much alive. Modern integration policies need to focus both on individuals and on integrating aspects of both individual and collective identification, recognizing their equal value.

Iveta Kazoka, Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS in Latvia describes the Latvian integration policy in “Challenges of integration: the case of Latvia”. One of the main integration challenges in Latvia is about including the country’s large Russian-speaking population in the Latvian national identity. At a societal level the Latvian society is rather united, but issues such as the interpretation of contemporary history, attitudes towards Russia, the status and rights of non-citizens, the usage of the Russian language and the role played by parties representing the Russian-speaking population, cause tensions. Controversial integration policies aimed at tackling these issues resulted in a counter-response from Russian-speaking activists who forced through a referendum on the introduction of Russian as a second state language. The outcome of the referendum was a rejection of the proposal. However, it brought with it a change in the public discourse on integration in Latvia towards unifying activities and a process of reconceptualising identities. Sweden has, since 2008, arguably the most liberal labour immigration policy in the OECD. As a result, labour immigration has increased its share of the total migration to Sweden in recent years. In “Straight into the labour market, straight into society? On Swedish experiences with labour immigration and integration” Lisa Pelling, Global Challenge, elaborates on the Swedish labour immigration policy and its implications for integration. When comparing integration policies across countries, Sweden is often ranked very highly. However, Sweden has had limited success in levelling out differences between natives and immigrants on the labour market and few labour immigrants have so far converted their temporary work permits into permanent residence permits. Two reasons for this could, according to Lisa Pelling, be the seasonal character of much of the labour performed by migrants, and that the terms of employment offered to labour immigrants in practice often do not meet the stipulated requirements for them to be able to renew their work permits. Labour migration
implies short-term labour market access, but this does not necessarily mean that labour migration favours integration in society, argues Pelling.

The Baltic States went from being called the “Baltic Tigers” at the beginning of the century, to experiencing among the most severe downturns of the entire global economy during the economic crisis. Unemployment rose, real wages fell, and the rates of poverty and social exclusion soared. Charles Woolfson, Professor at REMESO, Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society, Linköping University, is interviewed about the regional complexities in the Baltic States in “Migration, Austerity and New Challenges to Social Sustainability in the Baltic States – A conversation with Charles Woolfson”. The economic crisis produced an exit on an enormous scale, especially among people of working age. To counter the trend of decreasing populations and the economic downturn, the Baltic States have pursued a neo-liberal path with harsh austerity measures. The result was an important economic recovery, but also increased inequalities and exclusion, social pessimism and further emigration. Woolfson argues that the Baltic States need to invest in education, jobs, inclusive citizenship, liberal migration and integration policies, and to rebuild the cohesion of the democratic system.

The emigration from Lithuania has resulted in significant shortages on the labour market. The Lithuanian government’s strategy to counter these shortages has been to introduce several new labour immigration policies and to encourage the return of emigrated Lithuanians, writes Vija Platačiūtė, researcher at Vytautas Magnus University, in the text “Lithuanian Labour Immigration Policy: Regulations and Outcomes”. Lithuania’s labour migration policy is principally focused on “qualified” and “highly qualified” labour migration. However, labour immigration is still regarded as a temporary phenomenon in Lithuania and has little support from the population. Consequently, the policies are designed to meet (short-term) needs on the Lithuanian labour market, while neglecting the perspective of the labour immigrants themselves.

The varying demographic conditions, the EU policy context, as well as member states’ different job structures, have to be taken into account when discussing labour migration and migrant integration in the EU and in the Baltic Sea region, argues Tadas Leončikas, Eurofound, in “Labour migration and migrant integration in the perspective of recent EU Policy developments: Selected Highlights”. Since 1999, there have been on-going efforts to put in place a more coherent EU strategy for labour mobility – both from third-countries and within the EU member states. Social and economic integration of labour migrants is crucial for labour market success, since foreign workers are more likely to experience discrimination than native workers. It is essential to not forget labour migrants in the discourse on labour, underlines Leončikas.

The labour immigration to Poland, especially of Ukrainian seasonal workers, increases every year, altering the country’s historical migration trend. This transformation from a typical emigration state into an immigration-emigration country is a consequence of liberalized regulations as well as increased interest among non-natives to work in Poland. Prof. Maciej Duszczyk, Institute of Social Policy, Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, discusses this transformation in “Liberal Immigration Policy? The Case of Ukrainian Workers on the Polish Labour Market”. A new institutional framework and effective integration measures will be essential to meet future challenges with increased immigration, argues Prof. Duszczyk.

A third of the Estonian population consists of non-citizens and a quarter of the population identifies itself as Russian. Aune Valk, Ph.D. in psychology, provides us with a personal and psychological aspect of Estonian integration policy in “Integration...”
policies and acculturation in Estonian society in the last two decades". The Estonian integration policies have adopted an Estonian version of multiculturalism; an attempt at creating a common identity while acknowledging the Estonian multicultural society. However, the Estonians have not seen their own role in this integration process, which has created a lack of coherence between the majority and the Russian-speaking population. Aune Valk stresses that language and cultural learning should be tools for inclusion, not the other way around.

Similar to other European countries, the Baltic States and Poland face labour shortages in important sectors of the labour market. These shortages are due both to the ageing of the population and to a mismatch between the demand and supply of labour. Immigration as a tool to fill labour shortages is necessary, but not uncomplicated and entails that certain requirements are met, argues Anna Platonova, Regional Office for EEA, EU and NATO, International Organization for Migration in “The Future of Labour Immigration in the Baltic States and Poland: Labour Market Needs and Policy Dilemmas”. Only policies that properly map the labour shortages and are introduced in tandem with integration measures can succeed in assisting employers and adjusting migration flows to changing labour market conditions, says Platonova. The goal should be that migrants are ensured employment not just for now, but also for many years ahead.

Anna Horgby works as project officer at Global Challenge, Stockholm. She recently finished her master’s degree in political science at Stockholm University. Previously, she has been an intern at the EU Delegation in Canada and studied in Brussels. After finishing her internship, she has been working with the migration and integration programme at Global Challenge.

Veronica Nordlund is a project manager with the migration programme at Global Challenge, Stockholm. She has an MSc in economics from the Stockholm School of Economics. She has been with Global Challenge for two years and before that interned at the Embassy of Sweden in Singapore and at the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in Paris.
The concept of multiculturalism has shifted from being hailed as a universal solution to the concerns of globalisation to being blamed for all kinds of failed policies. Kristina Kallas from the Institute of Baltic Studies in Estonia, describes how multiculturalism has been interpreted and why it has become the scapegoat for various migration and integration problems.

Multiculturalism defined pretty much how states perceived themselves in the late 20th century. It was a norm that was lifted high in the ranking of “good politics”. Everyone wanted to be multicultural. We believed that multiculturalism was the solution: the solution to the multicultural global world that was evolving in front of us. We believed that multiculturalism would create a harmonious social life. Most of all, we believed that multiculturalism was the right thing to do.


Once it connoted curry and the Notting Hill carnival; these days, when applied to British politicians or their policies, ‘multiculturalism’ is almost as derogatory a term as ‘socialist’ or ‘neocon’. Even more than they agree about most other things, the main political parties are united in their convictions that multiculturalism is a perniciously naïve idea whose time has gone, or ought never to have come at all. [The author’s emphasis].

The German Chancellor Angela Merkel (left picture below) stated in October 2010 that “this [multicultural] approach has failed, utterly failed”. Merkel argued that too little had been required of immigrants in the past. They should learn German in order to manage school and take advantage of the opportunities in the labour market.

1 This article builds on a presentation held by Kristina Kallas at the expert seminar “New era in integration policies in the Baltic Sea countries?”, held in Tallinn, Estonia on the 25th of February 2013.
The British Prime Minister David Cameron (right picture above) reasoned in a similar way. He started a speech in February 2011 with a discussion of terrorism and continued:

*Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values. Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism. That includes making sure immigrants speak the language of their new home. And ensuring that people are educated in elements of a common culture and curriculum. It’s that identity— that feeling of belonging in our countries that is the key to achieving true cohesion.*

Multiculturalism was to be blamed. However, the globe continues to spin: People are on the move now more than ever before. Doug Saunders estimates in his book “Arrival City” that between two to three billion people—a third of the world’s population—will move from their current homes mainly to cities and that “we will end this century as a wholly urban species” (Saunders 2011).

Large migration flows are not a new phenomenon. The last time Europe experienced such a dramatic migration was between the late 18th and the early 20th centuries. The direct effect of the mass migration was a complete reinvention of human thought, governance, technology and welfare. However, the influx to Europe also created urban communities of people who got trapped, excluded and resentful. During this period a lot of people were uprooted, deprived of their rights, and made urgent and sometimes violent attempts to gain a position in the urban order. The French revolution and the industrial revolution happened. Today, with large groups of people on the move again, we face the situation where—to use Amy Gutmann’s words—“not all people are as multicultural as [Salman] Rushdie, but most people’s identities, not just Western intellectuals and elites, are shaped by more than a single culture. Not only societies, but people, are multicultural” (Gutmann 1993).

How many people in Europe today are shaped by only one country, one language, citizenship of one country and one religion? How many people have never lived outside of their place of birth, or even travelled outside of their country? Who speaks only one language? Who has no close family member with another language or religion than his or her own? Who has never had a neighbour or a colleague who was foreigner? There are surely people like this. But even these people meet travellers or travel themselves to places where they are faced with different cultures and languages. We are all multicultural and multiculturalism is very much alive.

Then, what did Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Cameron mean when they spoke about the failure of multiculturalism? There are three possible meanings:

- **Demographic and descriptive (sociological).** A multicultural society means a society that is composed of different ethnic or cultural groups. How are these differences expressed? What is the relationship between the different groups? How is meaning created and changed? Multiculturalism is perceived to be a problem of cohesion of the society.

- **Ideological and normative (political philosophy).** Multiculturalism is seen as a philosophical answer to the challenges posed by the multicultural society. Is multiculturalism good or bad? What kind of problems and challenges does multiculturalism need to solve? How much does it cost to society, morally and monetarily, and how are these expenses normatively valued?

- **Policy and programmes (political science).** A multicultural state and policies compose the establishment of multicultural programmes and policies based on the philosophy of multiculturalism. How should the state and society be arranged in order to meet the challenges of multiculturalism?

What European leaders denounced as a failure was the policy. If assuming that they were right—that the policies have failed to produce peace and cohesion—the societies still remain multicultural (and with every year more and more so) and there is still a need to overcome the challenges it poses: the segmentation, fragmentation and conflict.

However, assimilation is not the solution in the 21st century. The Internet allows taking your home country with you anywhere you go. People today
live in many cultures and even in many countries at the same time. Furthermore, regardless of nationality, language or cultural belonging, humans, wherever they live, demand to be acknowledged: demand acknowledgement of their cultural and social rights, their dignity and their values. This demand – a demand for recognition as a human – is, however, a very modern phenomenon.

Without going too deep into the Canadian political philosopher Charles Taylors’s discussion on the change of identity in modern times, it is sufficient to say that dignity is one of the fundamental elements of the modern human identity. With the move from honour to dignity, a policy of universalism has followed, emphasising the equal dignity of all citizens. The content of this policy has been the equalisation of rights and entitlements, aiming to avoid the existence of “first-class” and “second-class” citizens.

Simultaneously, however, we have witnessed the birth of a policy of difference with the emergence of the modern idea of individualised identity. This identity includes the idea of tolerance towards differences, and requires acceptance of each individual or group of individuals’ different needs. There is, however, a built-in ambiguousness between the individual and the collective identity. All individuals must have equal political rights irrespective of their ethnicity or cultural belonging. Likewise, all individuals need to be able to feel that their culture is recognised and valued. Modern identities create a double demand – for individual recognition and for recognition of a belonging in a social or cultural community. Modern human identities call for new norms and multiculturalism as a norm is what responds the best to this demand.

There is a need to focus on the individuals and to integrate the aspects of individual and collective identification in the policy creation: this is the challenge of integration policies in modern, multicultural states. Social cohesion and multiculturalism can only succeed in societies where different groups and individuals not only recognise the rights of others to exist, but also recognise the values of others. Multicultural societies develop conflicts precisely because of a lack of such recognition.

The recognition of equal value is not easy to achieve, since the idea of the nation state develops a public discourse of “we were here first”. The native population assumes its right of priority according to the national narratives. But someone was always somewhere before the others! Until this perspective – the national narrative of priority and of entitlement – is changed, we cannot build cohesive societies in the 21st century and we will be blaming our multicultural societies rather than the policies for the failure.
Kristina Kallas is a researcher and Member of the Board at the Institute of Baltic Studies in Estonia. She has a Master’s degree in Modern History from the Central European University in Budapest. At the Institute of Baltic Studies, her main responsibility is to lead the team working on issues related to social integration, migration and minority rights.

REFERENCES


In Latvia, more than one third of the population is of non-Latvian ethnic origin, and almost forty per cent of the population speaks Russian at home (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2011). In her presentation during the expert seminar "A new era in integration policies in the Baltic Sea countries?" in Tallinn in February 2013, Iveta Kazoka focused on the policies that are changing the Latvian conception of national identity.

Approximately fifteen per cent of the Latvian population consists of non-citizens. The non-citizens are citizens neither in Latvia, nor in any other country. They were Soviet citizens but could not or did not want to become Russian or Latvian citizens when the Soviet Union was dissolved. As non-citizens they cannot vote in neither parliamentary, nor municipal elections and feel excluded from the Latvian public sphere. One of the main integration challenges in Latvia is therefore about including both the non-citizens and the Russian-speaking population in the Latvian national identity.

The figure below shows how much ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russians living in Latvia feel that they have in common with each other and with Russians living in Russia.

Not surprisingly, ethnic Latvians feel that they have more in common with ethnic Latvians than

---

Iveta Kazoka

CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF LATVIA

This article builds on a presentation held by Iveta Kazoka at the expert seminar "New era in integration policies in the Baltic Sea countries?" held in Tallinn, Estonia on the 25th of February 2013.
Immigration in Times of Emigration

ethnic Russians, while the reverse is true for ethnic Russians. And yet, these attitudes do not point to a deeply-split society as an overwhelming majority of the ethnic Latvians feel that they have very much or many things in common with ethnic Russians (79 per cent) and a majority of the ethnic Russians feel the same for the ethnic Latvians (63 per cent). To put things into perspective – only 22 per cent of the Latvian population feels that they have many things in common with their closest neighbours Lithuania or Estonia.

This is one indicator that (along with the high rates of inter-marriage) proves that the Latvian society is more united at the societal level than a brief look at the official statistics would indicate. However, even though there are no deep-rooted tensions, there are several contentious issues that tend to produce stress in Latvian ethnic relations. The interpretation of contemporary history and attitudes towards Russia are examples of issues where a “statistically average” ethnic Latvian and an ethnic Russian in Latvia would not agree. Other disputative issues include questions regarding the status and rights of non-citizens, the usage of the Russian language in education, in official communication, in public services etc., and the role played by parties representing the Russian-speaking population who have never been part of the governing coalition. These issues have caused conflicts, and politicians in Latvia have tried to formulate integration policies to reduce the tensions by tackling these issues “head-on”, namely by promoting their own vision of what the “right answers” should be and that everyone living in Latvian should accept.

This way of reducing tensions between different parts of the population has proven to be harder than expected. Since the 1990s there have been attempts to define the aims of such a policy. In the construction of the policy, the politicians face several challenges and uncertainties. Should one focus on finding solutions to contentious issues or to find other ways to consolidate the society? What does it mean to be Latvian? What role does citizenship play? What do “ethnic origins” and “linguistic categories” imply? How do the Latvians identify themselves? What are the attitudes towards history? All these questions resulted in a deep confusion with no given answers. Another issue to tackle was the form the integration process should take: Should it be a one way or a two way process?

In 2011, the Latvian government presented Guidelines of National Identity and Society Integration for 2012-2018 (Nacionālās identitātēs 2012). These guidelines proclaim that 1) Latvia is a nation state (defining the Latvian cultural identity); 2) there are ethnic minorities with deep roots in Latvia (prior to the 1940s) whose rights should be protected; 3) individuals (and their descendants) who migrated to Latvia during the Soviet occupation should be considered immigrants; 4) being a “Latvian” is an open category – anyone can become a Latvian if he/she assimilates with Latvian culture. The main focus of the new policy was to invest more in teaching the Latvian language, to expand the use of the Latvian language, and to create a common “social memory”.

These guidelines turned out to be deeply contested as they dealt with exactly those questions that were particularly divisive for the Latvian society. Especially controversial was that Russian-speaking people born in Latvia were perceived as immigrants and that the only legitimate option for them to be considered Latvian was to assimilate with the Latvian cultural identity. Integration was perceived as a one way process where the responsibility to integrate was put entirely on migrants and on non-ethnic Latvians, while ethnic Latvians were not required to change. Another criticism directed towards the guidelines was that cultural identity and not civic values formed the basis of integration.

Partly as a response to this kind of integration policy, some Russian-speaking activists launched an initiative to hold a referendum on the introduction of a second state language – Russian. This was perceived to be a radical demand in the context of the previous integration discourse, and unrealistic as to the result it hoped to achieve (more than half of all eligible voters have to support a constitutional amendment in order for the constitution to be changed by referendum). Probably, it would not have gathered the necessary signatures for initiating the referendum (1/10 of eligible voters) if not for the specific context at the end of 2011: namely, the government creation process following the parliamentary elections in autumn 2011. After the election, the political party that was seen as the main representative of Russian-speakers’ interests, was not invited to be a part of the government despite gaining more votes (28 per cent) than any other
political party and having, according to Russian-speaking population, “won” the elections. Hence, the results of the government negotiation process caused much anger among the Russian-speaking population and led to more ethnic tensions than what was usual in Latvia. This event also increased the support among the Russian-speaking population for holding a protest referendum on two state languages. The referendum was held at the beginning of 2012, and, language issues being historically very sensitive and closely linked to the deeply ingrained identities, led to the record high turnout of 71 per cent of eligible voters (Central Election Commission of Latvia 2012). The result of the referendum was, as projected, a complete rejection of the proposal as three fourths of the population voted against it.

Despite the tense situation that led to the controversial referendum, it had some unexpected side-effects: the referendum on two state languages initiated a change in the public debate in Latvia. Partly due to the referendum, new trends appeared in the public discourse on integration. The president, the Ministry of Education and politicians in general started to show less belligerence and self-righteousness in order not to provoke future referenda. The focus shifted from a one way process to a process focusing on common events and civic participation, which included everyone regardless of their differences. These unifying activities were expected to result in a natural integration. There was also a conceptual shift from the necessity to “integrate Russian speakers” to the necessity of creating a “consolidated society” – which required input from the entire population. A process of a reconceptualisation of identities was also initiated, where the roots of the Latvian identity were put into question. With nearly half of the Latvian population still perceiving nationality to be grounded in the origins of the previous generation, the issue of identity has caused a substantial confusion among the Latvians. What does it mean to be a Latvian? Can you have a dark skin and simultaneously be Latvian? One way out of this confusion has been to move away from the ethnicity based identities, and instead build identities defined by citizenship. This has on the other hand led to a struggle over the inscription of ethnic origins in passports.

There are, thus, some encouraging trends in the recent discourse on integration in Latvia. The discourse seems to have become less preoccupied with ethnicity, less inclined to tackle head-on the sensitive issues that divide the Latvian society along ethnic lines, and more focused on building a common civic identity.
Iveta Kazoka is a researcher at the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS in Latvia. She is also guest lecturer at Vidzeme University of Applied Science and has previously been guest lecturer at University of Latvia. Iveta has also worked as senior desk officer at the Ministry of Justice in Latvia. She has an MA in Law from the University of Latvia.

REFERENCES


Partly pressed by demographic challenges, Sweden has introduced labour immigration policies that are more liberal than in all other OECD countries. After four decades dominated by asylum related immigration, more people are now granted residence permits on the basis of work than for humanitarian reasons. Even though labour migrants get immediate access to the labour market, the Swedish legislation does not provide a straight path into society for all labour migrants, writes Lisa Pelling, programme manager at Global Challenge.

For the past few years, it has been difficult to find a text about migration and the future of the welfare state in Europe that does not contain an opening paragraph with dramatic demographic data on ageing societies and shrinking populations. One of many alarmist reports on the European demographic decline is that of the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030. The Reflection Group, who was chaired by former Spanish premier Felipe González, reported its findings to the European Council in May 2010. In its final report, the Reflection Group warned that the EU must tackle its demographic challenge, since “[i]f urgent measures are not taken, our ageing societies will put unsustainable pressure on our pension, health and welfare systems, and undermine our economic competitiveness.” (González et al. 2010, p. 5). One of the priorities singled out by the reflection group was to develop “a more pro-active immigration policy” (González et al. 2010, 5).

Obviously, immigration can only be a part of the answer to demographic decline in Europe. Immigration from third countries needs to be combined with other measures. Indeed, the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030 found it just as urgent to expand labour market participation, by increasing the proportion of women in the workforce, and by increasing the statutory as well as the actual retirement age. Also, they wanted internal mobility within the EU to be encouraged (González et al. 2010, 24).

The projected demographic decline will affect growth rates and state finances differently in different countries. Some European regions will suffer more from demographic change than others. Countries that still have a large share of the female working age population at home, can compensate for the demographic decline by providing more women with the possibility to work on the formal labour market. Other countries can make sure peo-
ple stay longer on the labour market: Many European countries today have retirement schemes that make retirement in the mid-50s the rule rather than the exception.

Among EU member states, Sweden already has the highest share of women in the labour force, and one of the highest actual ages of retirement. The average female employment rate of the EU-27 was 58.2 in 2010, with Sweden recording the highest rate with 70.3. The overall employment rate in the EU-27 was 64.2 in 2010. Sweden scored second after Denmark (73.4) with an overall employment rate of 72.7 (Eurostat 2011a). The average exit age from the labour force is estimated at 61.4 years in the EU-27. For Sweden, the corresponding figure is 64.4. The Netherlands has the second highest average exit age with 63.5 (Eurostat 2011b). Sweden has also tried to make the most out of European mobility, by not applying any transitional rules and instead opening up its labour market to individuals from the new EU member states from day one in 2004 and in direct connection with subsequent enlargements of the union.

In the struggle to meet the challenges of demographic decline, one could argue that Sweden has used most of the tools in the toolbox already. Chances are, therefore, that Sweden will resort to increasing immigration earlier than many other European countries. In fact, to an extent, Sweden already has.

In December 2008, the Swedish parliament passed what the OECD considers to be the most liberal labour immigration policy among the industrialised countries (OECD 2011).

Sweden’s legislation on labour immigration

Sweden’s current legislation on labour immigration came into force on December 15, 2008. The new legislation is unique in that it allows employers to, while respecting the EU rule of community preference, recruit employees from outside the EU/EES countries and Switzerland regardless of the kind of skills the employer is looking for. The legislation makes labour immigration explicitly demand- and employer driven. “The point of departure is that the individual employer best knows the recruitment needs of his or her business. When processing cases involving residence and work permits, decisions are based on employers’ own assessment of their needs.” (Swedish Government Offices 2008, 2). In contrast to the current legislation at the EU level, that facilitates the entry of immigrants for “highly qualified employment” through its Blue Card-scheme (European Council 2009), Sweden’s recent labour immigration legislation extends to all kinds of employment, including low-skilled work. No requirements are made concerning the skills or educational level of the labour immigrant; instead it is the character of the job-offer that is decisive. (cont.)

Two main requirements have to be met. First, the labour immigrant must be able to support him or herself with the salary earned from the job, and second, the employment conditions must include income-, insurance- and working conditions that correspond to the conditions set in collective agreements in the relevant branch of the economy. Normally, the work and residence permit must be obtained before entering Sweden, but there are (limited) possibilities to get a visa to attend a job interview. Family members have the right to join, and work permits can also be issued to accompanying family members. The permits are temporary (for the duration of the employment or a maximum of two years) but they can be renewed several times up to a total duration of four years, and after that, a permanent residence permit can be granted. Should the employee become unemployed while having a valid work permit, he or she is given the opportunity to find a new job offer that qualifies for a work permit during a three month transition period.

The new legislation resulted in a 50 per cent increase of labour immigration in 2009 compared to 2008, but the numbers did not continue to increase at that rate in 2010 or later. In 2012, 19 936 individuals were granted a residence permit on the basis of work, constituting 17.9 per cent of the total number of people granted residence permits that year. The largest group of immigrants (36.8 percent) continue to be people granted residence permits on family grounds, the overwhelming majority of this group being relatives of asylum immigrants. Fifteen per cent were granted residence permits on humanitarian grounds (Swedish Migration Board 2013). See figure 1.4
Great hopes have been attached to the labour immigration reform of 2008. In a presentation of the reform, the Swedish Minister for Migration Tobias Billström wrote that “[i]ncreasing possibilities for labour immigration will play a decisive role for the ability of Sweden to meet both present and future challenges on the labour market” (Swedish Government Offices 2008, Notably, it was hoped that better possibilities to immigrate to Sweden to work would mean that a larger share of immigrants would go straight into the labour market. Partly because immigration to Sweden during the past decades has been dominated by asylum seekers and their family members, the time lag between arrival and labour market entry has been regarded as too long.

It was also hoped that a larger share of labour immigration would contribute to a changed perception of immigrants. The Swedish Minister for Migration Billström again: “The possibility to immigrate to Sweden to work should of course not replace the possibility to seek asylum here. The right to seek asylum is fundamental, and we protect it. But we think that labour immigration can contribute to create a more positive image of migration to Sweden” (Billström 2008, quoted by LO 2013, p. 43). That is, it was hoped that increased labour immigration would contribute to better integration of immigrants, thus reflecting better on Sweden as a migrant receiving country.

Sweden is often ranked high when integration policies are compared. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) compares integration policies in 31 countries in Europe and North America. Sweden has obtained the highest score in the MIPEX since it was first presented in 2007. In the latest edition (published in 2011), Sweden got 83 points out of 100 (Huddleston et. al. 2011). However, Sweden is not particularly successful when it comes to levelling out differences between natives and immigrants on the labour market (Wiesbrock 2011). In comparison to other countries, Sweden has a high level of employment among natives, but comparatively low levels of employment among the foreign born. This particularly concerns newly arrived immigrants. The gap between the rate of employment among natives and the rate of employment among the foreign born is larger than in all other comparable European countries (Szulkin 2012). These findings were confirmed by the OECD’s indicators of integration (OECD 2012), see figure 2.

In 2012, Global Challenge published a study on the connection between different channels of immigration and integration outcomes (see Pelling...
Immigration in Times of Emigration

The study was carried out as part of a project co-funded by the European Integration Fund and managed by the Swedish Migration Board.

We focused our study on the immigration from Iraq. Presently, Iraqis constitute the second largest group of foreign born in Sweden, after people born in Finland (see figure 3 below). The fact that migrants tend to follow a trodden path and migrate with the help of their social networks, means that Sweden will probably continue to experience significant immigration from Iraq for the decades to come. For our study, we conducted in-depth and focus group interviews with 45 newly arrived immigrants from Iraq, see figure 3.
We used a definition that regards integration as a process through which differences (such as levels of income and levels of employment) between natives and immigrants gradually diminish over time (Brubaker 2001; Bolt et al 2010). With this definition, integration on the labour market takes place when foreign born workers of comparable age, education, skills and experience with time attain the same salaries and employment rates as native-born workers (see also Venturini 2011).

In our study on Iraqi labour immigration, we concluded that the present design of the labour immigration system might have some negative consequences for the integration of third country nationals. In theory, the present Swedish system is designed to guarantee that labour immigrants are employed under conditions comparable to those of the native population. In practice, control mechanisms have proven inadequate to prevent abusive working conditions and salaries well below the level of collective bargaining agreements.

In theory, labour immigrants are provided with an opportunity for long-term integration in Sweden, since after four years on a temporary work permit, labour immigrants are entitled to apply for a permanent residence permit. In practice, very few labour immigrants have so far made use of this opportunity. Global Challenge did a follow-up of the first labour immigrants who arrived under the new regulatory framework in 2009. During 2009, 12,951 individuals were granted a temporary work permit under the new legislation. Of them, only 15 per cent had a residence permit in Sweden two years later (Pelling 2012, 27). One reason is that around a third of the labour immigrants are only offered seasonal work (for instance as berry pickers or in agriculture). Another reason is that a substantial share of the labour immigrants ends up in jobs with conditions below the standards required for them to be able to renew their work permit.

From our interviews, we concluded that labour immigrants from a country like Iraq might be particularly vulnerable to the insecurity that is created by the difficulty to turn a temporary permit into a permanent residence status. Insecurity and vulnerability characterises many migrants’ first months and years in a new country. It is important to note that this vulnerability is the result of many factors: not knowing the language, not knowing where and how to seek help and assistance, etc. The fact that permanent residency can only be obtained after four years on work permits has consequences particularly for migrants who for various reasons cannot or do not want to return to their home country. This was the case for most of the Iraqi labour immigrants we interviewed. Labour migrants who lose their residence permit if they lose their job are in a position of dependency towards the employer. Our respondents described how they had felt compelled to accept working conditions and levels of pay that they would not have accepted if they had not feared that losing their job would also mean losing their right to stay in Sweden.

Under the present legislation, there is a three month grace period during which labour immigrants who lose their employment can look for a new job that fulfils the conditions for a work permit. For individuals working in parts of the economy where jobs are scarce, this grace period is often too short.

Obviously, our sample of Iraqi labour immigrants was not representative of all labour migrants to Sweden. We interviewed fifteen Iraqi citizens living in Sweden on work permits. Even though several of them were highly educated, none of them had qualified jobs in Sweden. In Iraq, they had been doctors, teachers or engineers. In Sweden, they worked as cleaners, on construction sites, in restaurants or in auto repair shops. Labour immigrants whose qualifications and expertise makes them attractive to employers have a very different starting point. Those who have other options than working in Sweden are in an entirely different position to negotiate wages and working conditions, and therefore have much better prospects for their long-term integration on the Swedish labour market.

While the integration of asylum seekers on the labour market is slow, labour immigrants indeed go straight into the labour market. This does not mean, however, that they go straight into society. Prospects for integration in society are highly dependent upon the design of the labour immigration system. Particularly for labour immigrants who are in a weak position on the labour market, the possibility to obtain a permanent residence status is decisive.
Lisa Pelling is programme manager for Migration and Integration at Global Challenge, Stockholm. She is a PhD-student of political science at the University of Vienna. Parts of her research have been published in reports for Global Challenge and the Institute for Future Studies. Lisa has previously been a political advisor at the Swedish Foreign Ministry. From August 15, 2013 she will become Chief Analyst at the Swedish think tank Arena Idé.

REFERENCES


What are the future challenges in the Baltic States when it comes to migration and integration? We have talked with Charles Woolfson, Professor at REMESO, Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society, Linköping University, about the regional complexities of the Baltic States. Woolfson discussed the migration-development nexus, and what it means for both the sending countries in the Baltic States and the receiving countries in Scandinavia.

Charles Woolfson, you lived in the Baltic States for ten years, from 1999 onwards. You gave a presentation at the start-up conference of the project “Migration as a Part of a Policy for Increased Competitiveness” on December 7, 2012 in Stockholm, with the name “After the Crisis?” Why the question mark at the end?

Charles Woolfson (CW): It is very important, because of course, the crisis is not over yet. And we don’t know how it’s going to end. Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are down at the bottom-end of the EU-27 [now EU-28] in terms of GDP per capita, well below the EU average (see figure 1). The average monthly wage in Lithuania was 576 euros in 2011.

![Figure 1. Source: Eurostat 2012.](image_url)

This article builds on a presentation held by Prof. Charles Woolfson at the start-up conference in Stockholm, Sweden on the 7th of December 2012.
Sweden seems to be placed quite well on the figure above. What are the differences between the countries in the Baltic Sea region?

CW: The Baltic States and Sweden and Scandinavia are really two different worlds. The social protection expenditure in Sweden was almost a third of GDP in 2010, while Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland had social protection expenditures of 17.8 to 19.1 per cent of GDP. The Baltic States have, in contrast to the welfare-model that exists in Scandinavia, pursued a development strategy more based upon market principles and neo-liberal ideology. These different socio-economic configurations are what I wanted to emphasise during the seminar in Stockholm.

There was an incredible boom in the Baltic States, especially Latvia, at the beginning of this century and the countries were called the “Baltic Tigers”. During the seminar “After the Crisis?” you showed the extreme downturn in GDP these countries experienced during the economic crisis. Could you tell us what happened in the Baltic States during this period?

CW: In terms of square meter prices, the house prices in Vilnius actually exceeded those in Stockholm in 2007. There was a real property fuelled bubble of optimism and consumption. All limits were off. And the banks – especially the Swedish banks, who still regard the Baltic States as a kind of neo-colony – financed this bubble. I remember that while living there I would receive text messages from Swedish banks saying “come in and borrow money from us”. I was sure that this bubble couldn’t continue. The turnaround came in 2008. From the middle of 2008, the crash accelerated, and within a time space of twelve months, the GDP had dropped dramatically under the impact of the bursting bubble and the global economic crisis. These two factors meant that the Baltic States experienced among the most severe downturns of the global economy as a whole: approximately an 18 per cent loss in GDP in Latvia and a 15 per cent loss in GDP in Estonia and Lithuania.

Figure 2. Eurostat online database [15.05.2012].
What impact did the economic crisis have on the societies in the Baltic States?

CW: What the crisis meant in real terms was that businesses simply shut down overnight. The level of unemployment rose, after having decreased quite significantly, in particular after the European Union accession, down to a low point of four per cent in Lithuania in 2007. By 2009-2010, Latvia had a gross unemployment rate of 18 per cent, and Estonia and Lithuania were not far behind. There was also a staggering fall of real wages. The Baltic States suffered from momentous wage cuts and significant declines in household consumption and living standards. During the crisis there emerged radical differences between the Baltic States and the rest of the EU27 in terms of poverty and social exclusion. In Latvia in 2010, the rate of poverty and social exclusion was as high as 38 per cent of the population (Eurostat). A fifth of the population in Lithuania lived on less than 240 euros per month in 2010 and approximately six per cent on less than 90 euros per month. There was the beginning of a recovery from 2010 onward. And this recovery has been significant. But it is important to see where that recovery started from. The question is, how sustainable will this recovery be?

Turning now to the issue of migration: What impact did the crisis have on migration in the Baltic Sea region?

CW: With the EU accession in 2004 there were high numbers of people from Poland, Latvia and Lithuania that emigrated to other member states. In absolute numbers, the outflow was the largest from Poland (ironically the only EU country that did not experience a major recession in 2008), but looking at the percentage of the working age population, Lithuania and Latvia were the major emigration countries, with high rates of circular migration to for example Finland and Norway. Of the Baltic Sea states, Latvia and Lithuania have lost the most significant proportions of their working age populations. More recently, during the crisis, we have seen a dramatic spike in the Lithuanian out-migration, but out-migration has persisted also from Latvia and, to a much lesser extent, from Estonia. There is a debate going on, concerning whether the Lithuanian “spike” is a real representation of the out-migration that is going on. There was a change in the law in Lithuania that served as an efficient incentive for Lithuanians to declare their official departure from the country. Many people that may not previously have declared that they left the country did this in the period 2009-2010.
Nevertheless, the crisis has produced an exit on an enormous scale, especially among people of working age – who the countries cannot afford to lose. Figure 3 provides estimates of the scale of the out-migration. High numbers of very young people (0-14 years old) also leave the countries. This is a sign that this is a new phenomenon, not involving migration on a temporary basis from the new member states to the old member states; for the first time we see significant family out-migration. This shows a rather big step in people’s perception of what they think that the society has to offer them in terms of future life chances, prospects for themselves and for their children – and this speaks for itself in terms of sustainability. It’s no longer only unskilled, male workers that emigrate. In fact, male and female migration is about equal in numbers, with slightly higher numbers of female migrants.

Migration scholars like to talk about remittances – the money that people earn abroad and then send back to the source country. What can you say about remittances in the Baltic Sea region?

**CW:** In the Baltic States, the remittance inflows have been significant and substantial. In Latvia, they were high until 2008 and in the wake of the crisis they have now declined. Approximately 1.5 billion euros have been remitted to Lithuania from those that have gone abroad. In Latvia, about a billion euros have been remitted and in Estonia about 600 million euros (see figure 4). Remittances have a significant economic impact, although the influx is mixed. In 2010, about nine per cent of the Latvian household consumption was financed by remittances coming from abroad, slightly less in Lithuania and about three per cent in Estonia. So it is significant. Also in terms of the proportion of remittances to GDP, the numbers are significant. In Lithuania, the remittances’ share of the GDP was almost five per cent. In Latvia, Estonia and Poland it was between 1.5 to 2.5 per cent of the GDP, which shows the divergences between the countries. More people emigrate from Lithuania – proportionally speaking – and more people send back money to Lithuania. What is special about Lithuania? Has it got another migration character compared to Latvia and Estonia?
How is the situation in the Baltic States reflected in demographic patterns?

CW: The life expectancy for men in Lithuania is the lowest in the EU at 68 years. Compared with the life expectancy for men in Sweden, 79.6 years, the difference is huge. The three Baltic States have, together with Hungary, the lowest life expectancies in Europe. Low life expectancies, together with low birth rates, have resulted in negative natural increases of the population since 1993: There has been a decrease of the population in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since then.

The shrinkage of the population is most radical among people aged 20-29. And the population projections do not look good. The most radically ageing populations in Europe are found in the Baltic States. The most radically declining populations in Europe are found in the Baltic States. The projections (see figure 5) clearly indicate that there will be high future population losses in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, in addition to the substantial population losses they have already experienced. The question is: Is this sustainable? What kind of resources will there be left? How are the countries going to support the ageing population? Who is going to do anything in terms of productive employment when there are no people to do it – they have been exported?

![Demographic projections of Baltic states 2010-2060 (migration not included)](source: Eurostat)

What strategies have the Baltic States used to counter these demographic downturns and the economic crisis?

CW: They have chosen the neo-liberal path. The politicians in the Baltic States have chosen an excluding, harsh form of social development. This strategy has produced a highly contentious society where the voices of the people, democratic representation, and equity were all deprioritised, and where economic development was pursued at all costs. This is a form of society that rewards the rich, and stigmatises those who are not powerful and not successful. This neo-liberal narrative has been promoted by, among others, the former Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius in Latvia, who described it as a set of harsh measures that were nevertheless necessary for economic recovery. All over the world, austerity has been praised as the right way to go: “let’s follow Latvia”, “countries like Greece need to learn the radical way of devaluation, the radical form of austerity”, “follow the Latvian success story”. There are some counter-voices, that have been saying that “no, actually the price of pursuing radical austerity measures as a way out of the crisis has been too high” (e.g. Michel Hudson and Jeffrey Sommers).
If the austerity measures have created social inequalities and deprived the people of their voice, how have the populations of the Baltic States reacted?

**CW:** Due to the large cuts in wages and pensions, and other severe austerity measures, riots took place in 2009 in Riga and in Vilnius. When asked about a shift from state control to a free market-based economy, more than three fourths of the population in Lithuania said “yes, this is a good idea” in 1999, while only half of the population said the same thing in 2009. In 2009, nearly half of the population said that it’s worse today than during communism. What is it like now? Do the people believe that things are going in the right direction? In Sweden, a majority of the population believes that things are going in the right direction, and people in Estonia are not deeply unhappy either. In Lithuania and Latvia, on the other hand, there is a profound social pessimism [see figure 6 below]. This pessimism fuels emigration: People do not migrate only because of the economic situation, but also because of the social situation.

**Figure 6.**

So what are the main future challenges for the Baltic States?

**CW:** There are four main challenges. The first is the demographic decline, which threatens long-term fiscal sustainability, especially of the pension systems. How are we going to support the ageing populations? The second challenge is the labour force with high youth unemployment, a shortage of skilled labour, and skill mismatches, aggravated by high emigration. How to deal with skill shortages and matches for the medium and long term? What are you going to do when people do not find a way to finance public welfare systems? The third challenge is poverty and social exclusion, and the fourth is social disenfranchisement and political alienation creating further migration “exits.”

Finally, during the seminar “After the Crisis?” you mentioned that eventually all crises come to an end. What happens after the crisis in the Baltic States? How should the states meet the challenges of globalization?

**CW:** There are five issues the Baltic States have to reflect upon in order to meet the challenges. The first is education: Investment in skills, and vocational and higher education for taking the “high road” of competitiveness. The Baltic States have to handle the loss of teachers, lack of school children and lack of schools that the crisis has resulted in.
The second issue relates to labour: How to train the population to do the work that needs doing? Or is the solution to import workers because you do not have the people to do the jobs that need to be done? Non-Baltic labour will have to be recruited in the future to fill labour force gaps. This also relates to issues of identity and citizenship, which is the third issue. The question of “dual citizenship” and the position of non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia, where a significant share of the populations are non-citizens, has not yet been resolved. The fourth issue is migration policy and the issue of the integration of return migrants. Those who have left need to perceive that there is, somehow, a path back and that there is a future for them and their families if they do come home. The final issue relates to democracy and cohesion and people’s “voices” in politics, the community and the workplace. Neo-liberalism does not have social justice on the agenda. If you want to rebuild the cohesion and build a strong democratic system, you need to ensure that the people have a stake in the communities where they live and that they have a sense of empowerment at their workplace.

Charles Woolfson is Professor of Labour Studies at Linköping University, REMESO Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society in Sweden. He is also Research Fellow at the Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI) in Bratislava, and for a period of ten years from 1999, lived and researched in the Baltic States. Previously, he has been a visiting scholar at several universities and institutions.

In regard to further research on the above questions which are of wider European significance in terms of the fostering of a common 'social dimension' within the enlarged Union and preventing ‘wage dumping’ here in Sweden, Charles Woolfson would like to acknowledge the support of FAS (Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS), Project Number: 2011-0338, 'East-West labour migration, industrial relations and labour standards in a Swedish–Baltic context' and also the assistance of Indre Genelyte, doctoral student, REMESO, who prepared the above figures.

REFERENCES


Immigration in Times of Emigration
Lithuania has for a long time suffered from massive emigration. In combination with the ageing of the population, the outflux of labour has resulted in labour shortages in several sectors. Vija Platačiūtė, researcher at Vytautas Magnus University, discusses how Lithuanian labour immigration policy has been designed in order to meet this challenge.

The Lithuanian government’s strategy to counter the shortage of labour has been to introduce several new labour immigration policies and to encourage the return of emigrated Lithuanians. A majority and increasing share of Lithuania’s immigration consists of Lithuanians returning to their country of origin. In 2011, almost 16 000 Lithuanian citizens returned to Lithuania from all over the world.

The immigration of non-Lithuanians, for its part, has been dominated by a limited number of countries. About half of the immigrated population from non-EU countries residing in Lithuania has come from Russia, a quarter from Belarus and a tenth from Ukraine (see Figure 1). More recent immigration (based on 2009 figures) from non-EU countries consists of nearly forty per cent Belarusians, and only fourteen per cent Russians (see Figure 2). Worth noting is also the increasing immigration from faraway countries like China and Turkey. Figure 1 below shows the stock of non-EU immigrants residing in Lithuania in 2009 and Figure 2 shows the inflow of non-EU immigrants in 2009.

---

6 This article builds on a presentation held by Vija Platačiūtė at the expert seminar “Labour migration in the Baltic Sea countries: trends and prospects”, held in Vilnius, Lithuania on the 25th of April 2013.

---

Figure 1 & 2.

---

Among those who obtained a temporary residence permit in Lithuania between the years 2005 and 2011, a majority arrived as either migrant workers or family migrants. Between 2007 and 2009 as many as eighty per cent of the temporary migrants to Lithuania arrived to work or to reunite with their families (Migration Year Books 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012). This composition of the immigration is partly due to Lithuania’s strategy to fill the labour market gaps. Below (see Figure 3 above) strategies and policies related to immigration are presented on a time-line.

Lithuania’s Immigration Policy Guideline from 2008 was designed to tackle the demographic challenges in Lithuania. The policy has three main goals: 1) to seek to ensure that Lithuania does not experience workforce shortages and to avoid detrimental effects to Lithuanian society due to emigration and population, 2) to ensure effective management of immigration flows, and 3) to actively participate in the formation of EU immigration policy. However, the guideline was more of a political declaration, and never really became a proper strategy with tools for practical implementation.

There are different regulations for different categories of labour migrants in Lithuania. Lithuania’s labour migration policy is principally focused on “qualified” and “highly qualified” migration of people with at least two years of experience within the same field of expertise in the past three years. The permits can be issued for up to two years for employment in sectors where there are labour market shortages. Since 2010, more than eighty per cent of the permits have been issued for employment in the services sector and the residual in the industrial sector. Compared with earlier years, this is a complete shift. Between 2005 and 2009, construction, manufacturing and transport were the main sectors for labour immigration to Lithuania (Lithuanian Exchange Office 2012).

The regulation of “highly qualified” immigration was liberalised in 2009 and enabled family reunification. The processing time for temporary residence permits was moreover reduced from six to two months. A “highly qualified” immigrant is in Lithuania understood as a person performing a profession which is listed in Lithuania’s highly qualified professions list, a researcher at a research institution or someone engaged in pedagogical activities, a person who works with projects of high importance for the Lithuanian state, or a person who receives a salary higher than three times the national average. A high professional qualification signifies a qualification which is gained by holding a university degree, or alternatively having at least five years of work experience equal to a university degree qualification.

In 2012, further amendments were made to the regulation of highly qualified immigration. Now it is no longer necessary to have a work permit. Instead the Lithuanian Labour Exchange decides if the employment meets the Lithuanian labour market needs. With the new regulation it is also possible for highly qualified migrants to change employment. The wage requirement of three times the national average in Lithuania has been replaced with two times the national average. The impact of these liberalisations is however limited.
since highly qualified immigration only makes up about three to five per cent of the foreign workforce in Lithuania.

The regulation concerning researchers was also liberalised in 2012. Researchers who work in higher education or at research institutions do not need work permits, resident permits (for less than a one year stay in Lithuania) or to perform labour market tests. For migrants who have been issued work permits within sectors where there is a labour market shortage, the labour market tests still remain in place (Taljūnaitė, Gumbrevičiūtė-Kuzminskienė and Labanauskas 2009).

Foreign workers in third country registered companies can be employed in Lithuania in case of labour shortages. These labour immigrants are not covered by labour market tests. This is a fairly liberal exemption and, starting this year (2013), posted workers can stay in Lithuania for up to two years – previously they could stay up to one year only.

Labour Immigrants employed in sectors with labour shortages can come to Lithuania under a simplified procedure. Between 2007 and 2009, more than half of the work permits were issued to this category of employees. The list of professions where there are labour shortages in Lithuania is updated every half a year. The last year’s list contained only four professions. This could be compared to over sixty professions during the economic growth period between 2000 and 2008.

Labour immigration is a complex issue in the Lithuanian public discourse and it has little support from the population. Public opinion polls reveal that Lithuanians are afraid that labour immigrants will “steal” their jobs, that they threaten the social fabric and the country’s stability, as well as the Lithuanian national identity. These fears mostly spring from media images and to a much lesser extent from personal encounters. Nearly 85 per cent of the respondents in one survey had a negative view of labour migration because of competition and deteriorating working conditions, and almost half of those surveyed did not want to work with labour migrants (IOM Vilnius 2010, Sotirovič and Žibas 2011).

(Labour) immigration is in Lithuania regarded as a temporary phenomenon, which exists only to handle labour shortages. Consequently, the policies are designed to meet (short-term) needs on the Lithuanian labour market, while neglecting the perspective of the labour immigrants themselves. For instance, there are currently no state-sponsored integration programmes or advisory bodies for immigrants, which makes immigrants vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

Historically, immigration policy has not been a priority in Lithuania. The focus has instead been on the emigration process and the consequences of this process. The situation changed when the labour immigration flows increased. In 2007, the Economic Migration Regulation Strategy was approved and one year later the Immigration policy guidelines were introduced. This may be regarded as an onset of a long-term immigration policy in Lithuania. It is likely that European countries in the future will need a more varied labour force, including both high-and low-skilled workers. Changes in the Lithuanian immigration regulations should be made accordingly. As it is now, low skilled migrants have no opportunity to really integrate in the Lithuanian labour market. Both the population of Lithuania and a majority of the politicians have a priori negative attitudes towards foreigners. This implies that the social and economic development needs of the country are not allowed an adequate evaluation.

Below (see table 1) a summary of the observations related to the Lithuanian immigration policy and the implications of these observations is presented.
Observations on the Lithuanian immigration policy and implications of the observations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBSERVATION</th>
<th>IMPLICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no long term immigration policy strategy based on scientific studies with long-term perspectives</td>
<td>Immigration policy formed by migratory behaviour and ad hoc principle and interest group pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict and selective (labour) immigration policy</td>
<td>Immigration remains limited and is unable to compensate for losses of emigration in the Lithuanian labour market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority of circular labour immigration policy</td>
<td>No opportunity for labour immigrants to stay longer than two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction of liberalization for immigrated researchers and unified regulations for highly qualified migrants</td>
<td>Influence of EU legal regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement of qualification</td>
<td>Only qualified and highly qualified immigrants can enter the Lithuanian labour market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative public opinion regarding labour migrants</td>
<td>Intolerance in society: the fear of immigration is not adequate to legal regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of (labour) immigrants is not a priority in immigration policy</td>
<td>Funding from the European Fund for the Integration of Third-country nationals is considered the only option to improve the infrastructure of migrant integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No integration programmes or consultation bodies are provided for labour immigrants by the state</td>
<td>Much room for abuse and exploitation of labour immigrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Vija Platačiūtė is a PhD candidate in political science at Vytautas Magnus University in Lithuania. Her field of interest is immigration and integration policy, and migration processes in the Baltic Sea region. She is also researcher at NGO Diversity Development Group.

REFERENCES


FURTHER READING ON LABOUR MIGRATION IN LITHUANIA


Immigration in Times of Emigration
The situation in Poland is rather particular. Poland is still predominantly an emigration country, but simultaneously immigration to Poland is growing. Prof. Maciej Duszczyk, researcher at the Centre of Migration Research at Warsaw University, discusses what this transformation implies for Polish immigration policy.

The number of immigrants interested in taking employments in Poland is growing every year. A large share of this number is made up of Ukrainians looking for seasonal jobs in Poland. Between 2007 and 2009, extensive liberalisation of labour immigration regulations was introduced in Poland. The legislation on the employment of third country nationals was gradually liberalised, opening up for increasing inflows of labour immigrants. The increasing interest of migrants to work in Poland, as well as the newly introduced liberalisation of labour immigration, contributes to an alteration of the country’s migration trends. Poland is currently going through a transformation from a typical emigration state into a country which is characterised both by a steady immigration as well as by continuous emigration. The share of foreigners in the Polish labour market remains insignificant so far, but this situation is bound to change in the coming years.

Below is a figure (figure 1) on the number of work permits applied for and issued in Poland between 2004 and 2012.

Figure 1.

7 This article builds on a presentation held by Prof. Maciej Duszczyk at the expert seminar "Labour migration in the Baltic Sea countries: trends and prospects", held in Vilnius, Lithuania on the 25th of April 2013.
Some of the most important liberalised rules regarding the issuing of work permits entered into force on February 1st 2009. This can partly explain the increase in the number of issued work permits in 2009 compared with previous years.

Labour migrants have two options when they go to Poland to work. Either they can apply for a work permit (as shown above) or for a so-called “declaration of employers”.

The work permits are based on labour market tests, which implies that there has to be a labour shortage in the particular field of work that the work permit is applied for. Half of the work permits are issued to Ukrainians, who mainly work in agriculture and construction.

The declaration of employers is an instrument that allows citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Georgia to work in Poland. Except Russia, these countries all participate in the Eastern Partnership (EAP). Migrants from these countries do not need a work permit, but only a declaration from a potential employer in order to receive a residence visa with a work permit for a maximum of six months within a twelve month period. This regulation, also called the “simplified procedure”, is easy to follow for both employers and non-Polish employees. Since the declaration allows the foreign employees to work for only six months a year, it strongly encourages seasonal employment and circular migration. Almost 75 per cent of the declarations were issued within the agricultural and construction sectors.

The figure below (figure 2) shows the number of issued declarations, separated by nationality.

From 2008 onwards, the trend is clear – the number of declarations is increasing, especially for Ukrainian workers. Moldova joined the program in 2009 and Georgia in 2010.

Emigration still dominates the migration patterns to and from Poland, but immigration has increased substantially over the past years. Due to the simplified and liberalised regulation for labour migrants from the EAP countries – Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Moldova and Georgia – the labour immigration escalation has been particularly apparent from these countries.

More than half of the labour migrants in Poland are Ukrainian workers. Around 90 per cent of them are in Poland with a declaration of employers, but Ukrainian workers dominate all categories of labour migration: including declaration of employers, permanent stays and work permits. Therefore,
the labour immigration increase in Poland needs to be analysed in relation to the specific relations between Poland and Ukraine. The two countries are not only geographically close; they also have a long common history. They have a similar post-Second World War history, and relatively similar languages and cultures. In fact, one could argue that the relatively liberal Polish legislation is exclusively oriented towards targeting seasonal employment of Ukrainian citizens in certain sectors. An overwhelming majority of the issued work permits in Poland are issued for low skilled employment, such as agriculture, industry, construction, trade, transportation, hotels and restaurants, and household services.

Given the current labour market situation and the scale and structure of the immigration to Poland, a fundamental alteration of the immigration picture will probably not occur in the near future. Compared with the total number of people employed in Poland, the labour migrants constitute only a limited share. This suggests that their role primarily is to fill gaps on the Polish labour market.

It is difficult to predict future labour market shortages to one hundred per cent, but in the next few years Poland will most likely need more workers (not least as a consequence of demographic challenges). There is thus space for a future increase of labour immigrants in Poland. Meanwhile, many Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian, Moldovan and Georgian citizens are looking for employment. Immigrants from these countries are to a very high extent labour migrants and since they mostly have temporary employment, they do not constitute any burden to the Polish welfare state. However, in order to prevent imminent social exclusion of seasonal workers, as well as hostile attitudes towards migrants, a development of the institutional framework and effective integration measures will be essential elements in a future Polish immigration policy.

Maciej Duszczyk is Professor of Social Policy, Deputy Director of the Institute of Social Policy and Member of the Board of the Centre of Migration Research University of Warsaw. Previously, he has been Deputy Director in the Department of Economic and Social Analyses, Office of the Committee for European Integration (Ministry for European Affairs), and a member of the Board of Strategic Advisers to the Prime Minister of Poland. He is also collaborating with the International Labour Organization, the European Commission, and the International Organization for Migration.

REFERENCES


It is essential to not forget labour migrants in the discourse on labour. Tadas Leončikas, researcher at the unit for Living Conditions and Quality of Life at Eurofound, underlines the importance of focusing on working conditions when discussing labour migration.

Demographic conditions, the EU policy context, as well as the polarisation of the job structure, have to be taken into account when discussing labour migration and migrant integration in the EU. The demographic background and the role of migration in relation to demographic changes vary among the European countries. The table below (table 1) shows population growth and decline in the EU member states and the key drivers behind the demographic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOCRATIC DRIVERS</th>
<th>EU MEMBER STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth due to:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Only natural change</td>
<td>Ireland, Spain, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mostly natural change</td>
<td>France, Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mostly net migration (and adjustment)</td>
<td>Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Only net migration (and adjustment)</td>
<td>Germany, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline due to:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Only natural change</td>
<td>Estonia, Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mostly natural change</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Rumania, Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mostly net migration (and adjustment)</td>
<td>Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Only net migration (and adjustment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Contribution of natural change and net migration (and statistical adjustment) to population change, 2011.*

Table 1.

---

8 This article builds on a presentation held by Tadas Leončikas at the expert seminar “Labour migration in the Baltic Sea countries: trends and prospects”, held in Vilnius, Lithuania on the 25th of April 2013.
While Poland has experienced population growth due to natural demographic changes, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have seen their populations decreasing. The main reason for the population decline in Latvia and Lithuania is emigration.

The immigration of non-EU citizens represented two thirds of the EU population growth in the past decade, and half of the employment growth in the past five years. Out of over 30 million non-nationals in the various EU member states, 20.7 million are non-EU citizens. 5.7 million people have acquired a citizenship in one of the EU27 member states over the last decade (2002-2011). Immigration is both a fact and a policy matter – at national as well as European level.

EU policies on migration and integration need to consider the labour market demands at both ends of the skills spectrum – which is acknowledged by the Europe 2020 strategy, a governing policy programme of the EU introduced in 2010. The strategy aims to create a better match between labour supply and demand. In February 2013, the European Commission called for a Social Investment Package (EC 2013) with the purpose of handling the challenges in response to the economic crisis and current demographic changes. The package acknowledges the more diverse populations in the EU member states, including a more diverse workforce, and more diverse lives. Also, it requests efficiency improvements in policies and encourages a cost-benefit analysis. This package opens a window of opportunity for research on the costs of non-action and missing policies – including those on managing migration, labour markets and designing integration.

One of the background elements that may affect both migration and patterns of migrant integration is job structure. With regard to job structure in terms of wages, a tendency of polarisation was observed during the current recession in the EU as a whole: the number of middle-waged jobs decreased the most, while the low-paid jobs did not shrink that much and the number of well-paid jobs actually grew (see Eurofound 2013). Between 2011 and 2012, both Poland and Sweden experienced a high growth in well-paid jobs and a decline in low-paid jobs. During the same period, Lithuania had a minor decline in well-paid jobs, a major decline in the lowest-paid jobs and a slight growth in middle-paid jobs. Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, had no linear patterns regarding the job structure. In the figure below (figure 1), the job structure development between 2011 and 2012 is described. The bars symbolize increases and decreases in different wage-groups, where the first bar represents the quintile with the lowest-paying jobs, while the last bar represents the quintile with the highest-paying jobs.

![Figure 1](image-url)
In regard to recent EU policy development in the area of labour migration and integration, major elements involve policy measures that target access to the labour market and integration. Since 1999, there have been on-going efforts to put in place a more coherent EU strategy for labour mobility – both from third-countries and from within the EU member states. In 2009, the Blue card directive, aimed to attract highly qualified third-country nationals (TNCs) to the EU, was decided upon by the Council. In 2011, the European Single Permit Directive was adopted by the European Parliament. The single permit directive introduces a common application procedure and a common set of rights for TNCs who reside and work in an EU member state. Legislation on intra-corporate transfers of TNCs have been proposed, but not yet decided upon.

Several regulations to facilitate for EU member state nationals to take employment in other EU countries have been introduced over the last decade. For instance, the EU Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications (2005/36/EC) for EU member state nationals came into force in 2007. EU nationals can also, as “posted workers”, undertake temporary employment in other EU member states. There is, moreover, a European Job Mobility Portal (EURES) where EU nationals can look for vacancies all over Europe.

Regarding the integration of migrants, current EU level policy measures include the European Agenda for the integration of TCNs (EC 2011), comprising the TCN integration fund, the principle of subsidiarity and acknowledgement of the importance of local level governance. The Stockholm programme (2010–2014), which concerns justice, freedom and security in the EU, is another key measure targeting integration. What will the forthcoming renewal of the Stockholm programme entail? What about integration needs of the currently twelve million mobile EU citizens?

Migration and integration are constant concerns for all European institutions. The European Parliament’s latest report deals with the integration of migrants, the effect of migration and integration on the labour market and the external dimension of social security coordination (11.02.2013). For the European Commission (EC), one of the most urgent challenges is how the future responsibilities for migration and mobility issues will be allocated, and what roles the EC’s Directorate-General of Home Affairs and Directorate-General of Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion should have.

Social and economic integration of labour migrants is essential for labour market success. Insights from the European Working Conditions
Survey (EWCS) 2010 disclose why the situation of labour migrants and mobile workers matters. It is revealed that 12.6 per cent of the EU working population has a migrant background. The workers with foreign backgrounds are less satisfied with their working conditions compared to native workers. People with migrant background also feel less informed about job related health and safety risks. In general, migrant workers are subjected to discrimination to a higher extent compared with natives (see figure 2 on page 39).

The downside of the greater diversity (in all forms) in the European workforce is the increased risk of work related discrimination. In 2010, six per cent of the European workers said that they had experienced some form of discrimination at work – a slight increase compared with 2005. Strikingly, given the European policy goal of retaining people in work until a higher age, the most common complaint was of age discrimination – reported by three per cent of the workers. People with migrant background are more likely to encounter various forms of abusive behaviour such as verbal abuse (13 %), threats, bullying (6 %) or unwanted sexual attention.

Discrimination and harassment have significant effects on the health and well-being of respondents. Those who have been subjected to discrimination at work or to adverse social behaviour the past year are more susceptible to mental illness, and more prone to leave the workforce at a lower age, to be absent from work for longer time periods due to health problems, and to be dissatisfied with their working conditions. The differences between migrants and non-migrants are less pronounced in terms of perceived health risks, perceived financial security in case of illness, and general social support from colleagues or management.

The working conditions for migrant workers have recently become highlighted in both research and policy. For instance, a recent policy consideration at the EU level regards defining standards for au-pair work. Another emerging focus point is related to the social costs of mobility. One dimension of it is the challenges that inflow of migrants poses to public services: however, a study by the Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA, 2012) on the welfare dependence of migrants has actually found that welfare take-up by migrants is of a smaller scale than among comparable natives in many Member States.

Recent research also observes the costs related to the portability of social rights for migrants, the unmet integration needs of mobile EU citizens as well as the potential decline of certain labour market sectors in sending countries (arising e.g. from the mobility of healthcare professionals; EF report forthcoming 2013), different types of social costs for sending and receiving countries – these issues are still to be recognised and articulated in the policy field. The momentum towards a single European labour market so far remains uneven, and the potential scenarios deserve more attention in both research and policy.

Thus, at stake is not only more or less migration, but where, by whom, and to what types of jobs, as well as what the job structure outcomes are. In terms of measures to help integration, it is not only about targeting groups in terms of their origin or migration status, it is also about general measures to counter discrimination on the labour market, to raise job quality and improve working conditions. Labour migration, we must not forget, is not only about migration, it is also about labour, and the issue cannot be separated.

---

*The survey focuses on the working population and does not measure the discrimination preventing access to the labour market.*
Labour migration and migrant integration in the perspective of recent EU Policy developments

Tadas Leončikas is a research manager at Eurofound, the Living Conditions and Quality of Life unit. He works on the development of Eurofound survey research, in particular the European Quality of Life Survey. Tadas is a sociologist with research interests in social integration, equality and migration. As a researcher, he has previously worked on minority surveys and collaborated with the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the UNDP and the International Organisation for Migration.

REFERENCES


What can a non-governmental organisation do in terms of promoting migrant integration? How could civil society organisations in different European countries cooperate? We have talked with Kinga Wysienska, Ph.D., The Institute of Public (Social) Affairs in Warsaw.

Kinga Wysienska, you work with the Warsaw-based non-governmental organisation The Institute of Public Affairs. What does your organisation do?

Kinga Wysienska (KW): The Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) is a leading Polish think tank and independent centre for policy research and analysis, established in 1995. Our mission is to contribute to an informed public debate on key Polish, European and global policy issues. Our main areas of study include European policy, social policy, civil society, migration and integration policy and democratic institutions. The IPA works with key international institutions such as the European Commission and Parliament, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe and Community of Democracies. We are also active as members of many international networks and associations, including the Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS) and the European Partnership for Democracy.

How is your think tank dealing with issues related to migration and integration?

KW: We conduct research and provide research-based recommendations in various fields related to migration and integration, including research on emigration from Poland, re-emigration and immigration to Poland, and various dimensions of integration processes. We analyse Polish and European policies and are members of several consultation bodies at the local-, state-, and European level. Moreover, we cooperate with other non-profit advocacy organizations and academic institutions in order to influence policy makers on these issues. Finally, we organize campaigns targeted at a wider audience – citizens and groups of citizens – to raise awareness regarding the immigration and integration issues, and to prevent discrimination, xenophobia and racism.

What challenges do you encounter as a think tank in Poland?

KW: I will speak only about the problems faced by the Migration Policy Program as they are different from those faced by the whole organization. The major issue is a lack of understanding that the fact that the immigrant population in Poland is relatively small should not preclude work on integration policies. The current Polish approach is: “Why spend so much time and money on integration, when we have no one to integrate?” This kind of approach leads us nowhere, but often affects our funding opportunities and perception of the importance of what we do.

During the expert seminar “Migration, Integration, Europeanization – old and new challenges for policies and actors: The case of Baltic States” in June 2013, you put migration in Poland in the context of “Europeanisation”. From your perspective, do you see a Europeanisation of migration and integration issues?

KW: Since, among the public, out-migration is the most discussed issue when it comes to migration,

---

9 This article builds on a presentation held by Kinga Wysienska at the expert seminar “Migration, Integration, Europeanization – old and new challenges for policies and actors: The case of Baltic States” on June 27th 2013.
common European projects can accentuate issues that otherwise would not have been highlighted in Poland. I can give you three concrete examples of our projects that have contributed to providing a European perspective on integration issues in Poland: The so-called “European Testing Night”; discrimination testing of the labour and housing markets; and a project on Chinese and Vietnamese migrants in Poland.

The European Testing Night was organized by the European Grassroots Antiracist Movement, or EGAM. It took place on March 6, 2011, in 16 cities throughout 15 countries in Europe. The idea was to test if people with ethnic backgrounds different from the majority population were treated differently than the native population. In Warsaw, pairs of testers consisting of immigrants from Africa and white ethnic Polish males attempted to enter a club or a bar. Several incidents of discrimination were detected during the testing, as the African migrants were refused entrance. These tests resulted in widespread media coverage on discrimination in Poland. The City of Warsaw responded to the tests by introducing several measures. They decided to change all the renting contracts the city signs with companies such that they include an “equal treatment” clause. According to the clause, the City of Warsaw can cancel any company’s renting contract if it fails to respect the anti-discrimination policy. Warsaw has also decided to work on its own anti-discrimination program, and to collaborate with other European cities in the area of anti-discrimination. Furthermore, it established a special consultation body consisting of migrant organization representatives and non-governmental organisations, and included funds for research on immigrants’ situation in its yearly budget. So, this project was a great success.

The second example, discrimination testing of the labour and housing markets, is part of a project called “Different but equal – research concerning equal treatment of foreigners in Poland”. The project aims to identify the kinds of problems faced by non-Polish people, and to recommend measures for integration of non-natives in Poland. The labour and housing market experiments test the willingness to employ and rent out apartments to foreigners. The research is co-funded by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, the state budget and the City of Warsaw. The tests have been planned in cooperation with various academic and non-academic research and non-profit institutions in Europe: University of Portsmouth in the United Kingdom; The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in Dublin in Ireland; Stockholm University in Sweden; University of Brussels in Belgium; Sorbonne in France; and various European non-governmental organisations. The tests are on-going, so we cannot yet see results as concrete as those of the European Testing Nights.

The third example I wanted to introduce to you is a project on Chinese and Vietnamese migrants in Poland. During the 1980s–1990s many Chinese and Vietnamese citizens migrated to Central and Eastern Europe. Typically, Chinese migrants from Heilongjiang and Jilin migrated through the Russian Far East and East Siberia to European Russia. After the shift of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ policies towards Chinese migrants, migrants from Fujian and Zhejiang came through Moscow to Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, Romania and Poland. Due to changes in the Hungarian visa regime in 1992, Chinese migrants migrated from Hungary to Romania, Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, and Poland, but also to Germany, Austria and Italy. Some groups of Vietnamese migrants also migrated to Poland from Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic.

In other words, many of the Chinese and Vietnamese migrants in Poland did not come directly to Poland, but from other Central and Eastern European countries. Recently, we are experiencing an increase of labour migrants from China taking jobs in the commercial, industrial and construction sectors. It is therefore relevant to study the migration flows from these countries and the integration of Chinese and Vietnamese workers residing in Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries. The research on Chinese and Vietnamese migrants demonstrated that there is a network connecting Asian migrants living in Budapest, Prague, Belgrade, Bucharest and Warsaw.

What conclusions can you draw from these projects?

KW: Studies on patterns of integration, obstacles faced by migrants and evaluation of policies need to include experiences from other countries in the region. Integration of non-natives is a global challenge, and common experiences and the sharing of information can contribute to raising awareness and finding good solutions and policy measures.
Kinga Wysienska is an expert at the Institute of Public Affairs in Poland. She has a PhD in sociology and is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy. Kinga was a Fulbright scholar at the University of Iowa, and also received the Young Scholar Fellowship from the Foundation for Polish Science. She has taught and conducted research in a number of Polish and foreign universities, and served as a member of the Migration Policy Expert Team at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland. Her main research focus is on explaining the processes leading to inequality and exclusion, and finding ways to overcome them.
According to the 2011 census, a quarter of the Estonian population identifies itself as Russian, even though most of them are Estonian citizens. What are the implications of the fact that such a large proportion of the inhabitants does not identify as Estonians? What challenges does this pose to Estonian integration policy? Aune Valk, PhD in psychology, analyses Estonian integration policies from a personal and psychological point of view.

In 1992, 32 per cent of the Estonian population consisted of non-citizens. The high percentage of non-citizens was partly due to the fact that between 1944 and 1990 most Russian-speakers, regardless of where they were born, were considered immigrants and did not automatically obtain Estonian citizenship after independence. At present, fourteen per cent of the population still holds a Russian citizenship, or are undefined citizens (Statistics Estonia, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Office of Citizenship and Migration 2012).

---

10 This article builds on a presentation held by Aune Valk at the expert seminar “A New Era in Integration Policies in the Baltic Sea Countries” held in Tallinn, Estonia on 25th of February 2013.
People of one hundred forty two nationalities live in Estonia today (REL 2011). The immigrated population in Estonia is highly unevenly distributed: it is mostly concentrated to the north of the country. In some of the northern regions more than half of the population consists of former Soviet Union “migrants” (Statistics Estonia 2008). This demographic context poses several challenges to the integration process and the identity creation in present-day Estonia.

Since 1990, a lot of things have happened in Estonia regarding acculturation. In 1991, the independent Estonian state that existed before the Second World War was restored. The reforms (both political and economic) following the restoration of independence were very radical, and especially difficult for older people, for people in the country-side and for the Russian-speaking population.

A first integration strategy for the years 2000 to 2007 was initiated in 1998, first under the title “Integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society”, but finally entitled “Integration in Estonian society”. The integration strategy included three central concepts: 1) an individual-centred approach, 2) a common societal core, and 3) an Estonian cultural predominance. Pettai and Hallik (2002) described the core of the strategy like this:

The essence of the State Programme is nonetheless to integrate non-Estonians into an Estonian-dominant state and society. In this respect, it is meant to adapt non-Estonians to a pre-set Estonian world, not to alter that world (Pettai and Hallik 2002).

The years following the initiation of the integration strategy were characterized by an idea of integration of the Estonian society through an Estonian version of multiculturalism. This version of multiculturalism regarded integration as two-sided and included cultural pluralism, but ethnic differences were considered to be private matters. The emphasis was on building a common sphere, with common democratic and humanistic values, and shared information. Preservation of the Estonian culture was especially highlighted. This included a shared Estonian language, common knowledge about the Estonian history, and an acknowledgement of the Estonian multicultural society. The efforts where, consequently, concentrated on education, language and culture.

The integration strategy for the years 2008 to 2013 was more balanced and multiculturally oriented. Despite the multicultural approach the actions were still one-sided regarding for instance language acquisition and citizenship, and the Estonians did not see their own role in the integration process. This lack of coherence can be shown by the differing priorities of the integration policy among the ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking population in Estonia in 2008 (table 1 below).

While ethnic Estonians in 2008 prioritised the Estonian language, Russian-speakers prioritised equal treatment and tolerance. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, ethnic Estonians were continuously more disturbed by the different behaviour and lifestyles of Russians than vice versa (65 per cent versus 25 per cent). Russian-speakers in Estonia, on the other hand, had a lower trust in the Estonian government, parliament and the President (36 per cent compared to 66 per cent among ethnic Estonians).

In the integration strategy for 2008 to 2013, language learning was still seen as the main so-
Integration for almost all problems but for the first time, integration measures were directed to the whole society (i.e. Estonians included) in the form of increased tolerance and valuing of cultural pluralism. Participation in learning and employment, as well as a common state/citizen’s identity were the aims of the strategy (Integration Strategy 2008-2013).

The Estonian policies differ in many respects compared to integration policies in other European countries as Estonian ethnic composition and its historical formation differs. The focus of the Estonian integration policy is mainly on existing minorities, not new immigrants, which is the case in most of the countries in Western Europe. Compared with for example Sweden, the Estonian policies are more concentrated on culture and language, and less on economic matters. Employers, who are deeply involved in the integration processes in for instance Austria and Denmark, and NGOs, who have a high presence in the policy-making in the United Kingdom and Spain, are not included in the same sense in the Estonian policies. But there are also similarities: in most countries as well as in Estonia the role of the majority is rarely stressed.

Looking from the global perspective there are no major problems in Estonia but there are still challenges related to the small size of Estonia and big size of neighbouring Russia where most of the minority groups’ members are originated. Comparing values across European countries, Estonians value tolerance and respect for other cultures very highly – clearly above the EU average (Eurobarometer 69). However, as Estonians feel culturally threatened, they have rather closed attitudes towards immigration, protect strongly their language and due to recent occupation experience do not trust Russia and Russian policies. It is obvious that Russians living in Estonia do not have the same views in these questions. It is also problematic that integration is seen from both sides as assimilation, but the perceived assimilation pressure by Russian minority has had contrary results. It relates to a weaker Estonian identity. Multiculturalism in the Estonian context is rather bicultural than multicultural and often interpreted in the public discourse as an anti-Estonian political correctness imported from Europe. Multicultural identity – Estonian-Russian identity is acquired by 1/3 of ethnic Russians living in Estonia but the Estonian national/state identity is highly related to an Estonian ethnic identity. Therefore, it is difficult to become an Estonian in a civic sense, and the national identity means different things for different groups.

Given this context, what should the directionality of the acculturation be? Who changes what? According to its original definition (Redfield et al. 1936: 149), acculturation is a two-sided process that refers to the “changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups”. Future integration policies should hence, in order to be successful, also stress the role of Estonians in accepting the diversity, not just in general but also in their own surrounding. It is the key for the success of integration that multiculturalism would be a reality on an individual level: minorities should not feel that learning a new culture and language is somehow threatening their ethnic identity. Multiple identities should be accepted and positive merged/dual identities constructed. Future Estonian measures could for instance include early contacts with different ethnic groups (and languages) in kindergarten. Language and cultural learning should, finally, be tools for inclusion, not vice versa.
Aune Valk has been studying identity and ethnic relations for last twenty years and is editor of two books that study Estonians in comparison to other cultures. She has got her PhD in psychology from the University of Tartu and has been visiting researcher at the University of Sussex (UK) and Clark University (USA). Currently she is Estonian national project manager for PIAAC - OECD led Programme for the Assessment of Adult Competencies.

REFERENCES


The Future of Labour Immigration in the Baltic States and Poland: Labour Market Needs and Policy Dilemmas

Anna Platonova

THE FUTURE OF LABOUR IMMIGRATION IN THE BALTIC STATES AND POLAND: LABOUR MARKET NEEDS AND POLICY DILEMMAS

The Baltic States and Poland face several challenges regarding labour immigration and public policy. Anna Platonova, Regional Labour Migration/Migration and Development Specialist at the Regional Office for EEA, EU and NATO at International Organization for Migration (IOM), problematises the Baltic State’s and Poland’s labour market needs and policy dilemmas.

Similarly to the other European countries, the Baltic States and Poland face labour shortages in some sectors on the labour market. These shortages are both due to the ageing of the population and a mismatch between the demand and supply of labour. These trends present the challenge of reconciling several public policy objectives, such as identifying and meeting labour market needs and providing impetus for growth, upholding migrants’ rights and at the same time promoting social cohesion. What, specifically, are the labour and skill shortages and how can they be addressed? Can they be measured, and how? How could labour market needs be reflected in migration policies?

Labour and skill shortages are intricate concepts that are hard to measure. The uncertainty of the terms is reflected in the literature and in the public debate and no common definition has been agreed on. Different factors contribute to shaping them, including the relationship between patterns of production and employment, social factors, labour market regulations, welfare provision, education and training. Immigration is one of many possible measures in a wider policy mix designed to tackle labour shortages and market mismatches and their root causes. Interventions could range from increasing wages, changing production processes and improving working conditions to fostering labour market activation of current residents, strengthening links between education and labour market needs, or increasing imports. Compared to other measures, immigration provides a relatively speedy relief to employers and allows time to pursue structural adjustments.

However, ensuring that immigration policy helps to effectively address perceived labour shortages is in turn a complex task. This requires accurately identifying the labour needs, but also predicting business cycle effects, adjustments in wages, firms’ input mix, technology, process innovation or labour sources. Immigration policy developed based on this assessment would need not only to select the desired workers from abroad and define their rights in the country of destination, but also to ensure that it responds in a timely manner to the real labour market needs. Failing to do so, strong labour demand in the absence of adequate immigrant admission channels may result in grow-

This article builds on a presentation held by Anna Platonova at the expert seminar “Labour migration in the Baltic Sea countries: trends and prospects”, held in Vilnius, Lithuania on the 25th of April 2013.
ing irregular migration and worker vulnerability. Policymakers also need to consider labour market potential of other immigrant categories—such as family and humanitarian migrants, but also students. Incidentally, among these migrants, many face serious labour market integration challenges despite representing significant pools of labour of various skill levels.

Moreover, an effective labour immigration policy needs to be supported by operational tools to facilitate labour matching. The majority of the EU Member States have employer-led economic immigration systems, which implies that employers should be able to identify, assess and recruit workers abroad. Some ninety-eight per cent of all enterprises in the EU are small and medium-sized enterprises, for whom this is often a daunting task in the absence of trustworthy international recruitment support. The unethical practices of some intermediaries, who take advantage of ill-informed job-seekers, undermine existing legal channels for labour migration and places downward pressure on the labour markets of countries of origin. These irregular labour migration flows can exacerbate tensions in receiving countries and produce negative outcomes for migration such as poor integration, xenophobia and social exclusion, and in the worst cases may result in abuse, exploitation and trafficking of migrant workers. IOM is actively working with a wide range of government, private sector and civil society partners on enhancing the integrity and transparency of the international recruitment industry. To this end, the IOM is initiating the International Recruitment Integrity System—IRIS—an accreditation and monitoring process of international labour recruiters that will address jurisdictional gaps through an ethical recruitment framework that will allow accredited counterparts in countries of origin and destination to interact with each other in the recruitment of workers. Other key areas for multilateral and bilateral cooperation with countries of origin include support for the skill development of national workforces and improving the compatibility of occupational profiles in line with EU labour market requirements, portability of social and pension rights, and effective recognition of qualifications and competences.

Ultimately, the success of legal migration policies depends on the success of immigrant integration in their country of destination. Here, not only individual characteristics of migrants matter, but also the structural conditions in which their integration takes place—labour market and sectorial conditions, environment for innovation and entrepreneurship, extent of discrimination and so on. Countries that openly value tolerance and diversity tend to fare better not only in terms of immigrant integration, but also in being able to attract the very migrants they need. Inclusive societies and dynamic economies tend to play a crucial role in making a country competitive in the global labour market. Creating provisions for immigrant admission alone is not enough.

Within the forthcoming years the countries in the Baltic Sea region will have to consider the potential impact of migration (or its absence) on the economic recovery perspectives, and define the realistic scope for public policy interventions in this regard. Poland already showcases a strikingly different—very liberal—approach to labour immigration from the Eastern Neighbourhood countries compared to the Baltic States, but also differs considerably in terms of recent economic performance and the extent of existing challenges of ethnic relations and social cohesion. The prospect of managing increasing societal diversity in the future places a reinforced emphasis on the urgency to tackle existing integration challenges in the Baltic States. In addition, any process towards opening up towards non-EU workers would need to go hand in hand with efforts towards socio-economic inclusion of the segments of native population that have been marginalized during the recession, and stronger diaspora engagement policies. Continuing the internationalisation of higher education is an imperative if student and academic migration and mobility are to become a complementary element of labour immigration strategies in the region. Finally, these considerations inevitably lead to redefining foreign policy and cooperation with the potential and existing countries of origin, including towards the abovementioned practical initiatives to improve labour matching and integration perspectives, but also to ensure coherence with other external and internal policy areas, such as trade or development cooperation.
Anna Platonova is coordinating and providing thematic guidance to IOM’s work in the EU/EEA region on labour migration, integration and migration and development, and is based at the IOM’s Regional Office in Brussels. From 2009 to 2011, she was in charge of the IOM Independent Network of Labour Migration and Integration Experts (LINET), and published a number of comparative studies on various aspects of migration policy development and immigrant integration in the labour market. Before joining the IOM she has worked for over five years on migration and freedom of movement issues at the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE ODIHR), in particular focusing on promotion of development of evidence-based labour migration policies in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia.

REFERENCES

Without immigration, populations across all the Baltic Sea states shrink. What happens when demographic pressures push countries of previously and persistently high emigration to rethink their immigration policies? In the Baltic Sea region, immigration still constitutes a largely unused resource for development and strengthened competitiveness. We have to start viewing human migration and mobility as the resources for welfare improvement that they have the potential to be. But in order to tap into this resource, it is crucial to manage the challenges associated with migration, mobility and integration.

This report captures a selection of some of the most thought-provoking expert contributions to the project “Migration as part of a policy for increased competitiveness” — a collaboration of think tanks and research institutes working with issues of migration and integration in the Baltic Sea region. In eleven chapters that reflect the wealth and range of knowledge that has been shared and discussed in the course of this project, the report covers themes such as multiculturalism, the dangers of austerity politics, and the Europeanisation of migration policy. It also gives an accessible overview of recent developments in migration and integration policy in the Baltic States, Sweden and Poland.

“I applaud this endeavour to promote cooperation and increased understanding of the Baltic Sea region’s migration and integration challenges and opportunities ahead.”

Jan Niessen, Director of the Migration Policy Group, Brussels

Edited by
Anna Horgby and Veronica Nordlund