Integrating Estonia 2000-2011

An Analysis of Integration Monitoring Surveys
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2013

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Authors: Kristina Kallas, Ingi Mihkelsoo, Kaarin Plaan

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Introduction

In 2013 Estonia will pass the 15-year mark since the introduction of the first national integration policy in 1998. That year, seven years after its re-independence, Estonia adopted a national integration strategy called “Integration in Estonia 2000-2007” and established the Non-Estonian Integration Foundation. The target of building an integrated multicultural society dominated by Estonian language and culture was set.

In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia inherited an ethnically and politically divided society. During the first half of the 1990s Estonia received some criticism from international organisations and the Russian Federation alike for its rather exclusionary policies towards the large Russian-speaking population. The challenges that sprang from the political decisions of the 1990s were numerous, and here are just a few of them: the large number of people with undetermined citizenship; the low levels of knowledge of Estonian as the state language among the Russian-speaking population, and as a consequence the process of exclusion of this part of the population from the labour market and political participation; the estrangement of Soviet-era migrants from the new political life and serious economic, political and cultural ghettoising of some regions of Estonia where Russian-speakers were a majority.

In fifteen years numerous sociological surveys, national and international academic research and public debates have been carried out regarding the problems of integration in Estonia. The policy makers and society are better informed and aware of the challenges that political and ethnic division could pose to the Estonian state. In parallel, to address those problems, a significant number of integration policy measures have been designed mainly aimed at reducing the interethnic conflict and social estrangement of the Russian-speaking population. As a result ample knowledge and evidence as well as good practice have been gathered. However, new political processes of the last decade have created new challenges: Estonia has become a member of the European Union while at the same time the politics of neighbouring Russia have acquired more and more nationalist flavour. The Bronze Soldier crisis that swept through Estonian society in 2007 also provoked the re-examination of its integration policy.

After fifteen years of implementing integration policy it is time to review and evaluate the achievements. The current report aims to provide a short overview of the integration process in Estonia in the years 2000-2011 based on the integration monitoring surveys. The report summarises the integration process before it enters its third round with the introduction of the new national integration strategy Integrating Estonia 2020. The problems and challenges that

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1 There have been five rounds of surveys carried out in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011.
are monitored through integration monitoring surveys will inform the new integration policy and will guide the way towards the new policy goals.

Estonian Integration Process Based on Integration Monitoring Surveys 2000-2011

The first integration monitoring study was carried out in 2000. The rather acute ethnic conflict of the 1990s had subsided by then and the features of the Estonian ethnopolitical regime had taken shape. The main laws regulating the social, political, economic and cultural rights of minorities and immigrants had been adopted. A public debate about increasing social and political division, initiated by social scientists, resulted in 2000 in a new policy that envisioned as its outcome a socially and culturally cohesive society that in turn would evolve further into a multicultural community. Differently from the 1990s when the ethnic composition of the Estonian state, inherited from the Soviet occupation, was seen as a problem and the policy was designed to change the ethnic balance in favour of the Estonian ethnic group, by 2000 the public debate had gone through a near paradigmatic change as the multi-ethnic composition of the Estonian population was seen rather as an opportunity and the aim became the integration of different ethnic communities and cooperation. Thus in 2000 Estonia stepped on to the path of integration. The fresh integration policy programme searched for a cultural inter-community dialogue to initiate a two-way integration process. The goal was to develop a common national identity (riigiidentiteet) in the public sphere that was based on Estonian as the state language while at the same time supporting the ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences practiced in the private sphere.

The first monitoring study in 2000 focused on gathering information about this process through the following structural indicators: educational attainments of Estonians and non-Estonians, knowledge of Estonian, citizenship, participation in the labour market, social status, and income and career opportunities. In addition, the possibility of achieving a multicultural society was measured through the indicator of interethnic relations and tolerance.3

The second integration survey in 2002 focused, among other indicators, on scenarios of interethnic relations and integration attitudes among different population groups. Based on the data collected through the survey an integration attitude index for Estonians and non-Estonians was created and social factors that influence these attitudes were analysed.4

The third monitoring survey in 2005 continued to gather data on structural indicators started in the previous two rounds. In addition a new topic has arisen – the reform of Russian-language secondary schools that was set to start in 2007. The monitoring survey looked into the attitudes and extrapolated the opinions of young Russian-speakers towards the school reform. A national identity and sense of belonging of respondents was also brought into focus. Last but not least, the third monitoring survey pointed to the increased influence of the policies of the Russian Federation on the integration process in Estonia. The authors of the survey argued that integration in Estonia was not just a two-party but rather a three-party process where in addition to mutual tolerance and understanding towards each other’s cultural differences, good neighbourly relations with Russia also played their role.⁵

In 2008, the fourth survey’s focus and deductions are strongly influenced by the so-called Bronze Soldier crisis of 2007. The previous round of monitoring already pointed to the increased influence of Russia in the Estonian integration process, which culminated with the conflict in April 2007, driven by ethnic and political divisions. Different interpretations of the events of modern history (mainly the Second World War) and usage of different media channels emerged from the conflict as the main challenges to cohesion and tolerance and also caught the attention of researchers in the monitoring round. The 2008 monitoring survey looks into how much Estonians and non-Estonians differ in their information about the events in Estonia and their use of different media channels (this also continues in the 2011 monitoring).⁶

To date, the last, fifth monitoring round was carried out in 2011. It continued to collect information about structural integration indicators such as knowledge of Estonian, integration in the labour market and income inequality, political integration and the naturalisation process; however, it also brought out some new topics. Twenty years had passed since the re-establishment of Estonian statehood and since then new immigration to the country has taken place. Thus in 2011 monitoring new immigrants (post-1991 migration) were in focus in addition to the integration challenges of the “traditional” Russian-speaking population. Additionally, monitoring focused on the regional differences in the attainment of integration goals bringing out the need to develop more regionally differentiated integration policy measures. Most importantly, the 2011 monitoring challenged the prevalent one-dimensional approach to the integration of the Russian-speaking population by bringing out the large differences in the patterns of integration among the different groups of Russian-speakers.⁷

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Language as an Integration Engine

Increasing Estonian language skills among non-native speakers has been the main goal of the integration policy since its inception. In this chapter we will provide main data on Estonian language acquisition among non-native speakers. For more detailed information, the integration monitoring reports can be consulted.

Knowledge of Estonian has been measured through self-evaluation of the respondents rather than based on objective measurements. As can be expected, knowledge of Estonian is better among non-native speakers with Estonian citizenship compared to people with undetermined citizenship or Russian Federation citizenship. This ranking has remained the same throughout every monitoring round. Nevertheless, around 10% of non-native speakers with Estonian citizenship do not have basic knowledge of Estonian.

As of today around 1/3 of people with undetermined citizenship do not speak or understand Estonian (according to the last monitoring round 33%) while around 11% speak Estonian well. The knowledge of Estonian increased among people with undetermined citizenship between 2000 and 2002 (in 2000 only 4% claimed they could speak and understand Estonian well); however, since 2005 no improvement in the knowledge of Estonian has been detected among this group of respondents.

The first monitoring data showed that the lowest knowledge of Estonian is among the citizens of the Russian Federation. In 2000 half of this group did not have any knowledge of Estonian (56% could not write, 46% could not read and 39% could not understand). Only 16% of respondents evaluated their Estonian to be good or average. Within 10 years no significant changes have taken place in the knowledge of Estonian among the citizens of Russia. In 2011 nearly half of Russian citizens (47%) could still not speak or understand Estonian (6% had good knowledge and 21% evaluated their knowledge as satisfactory).

In 2005 significant differences occurred in the knowledge of Estonian among different age groups and between non-native speakers living in different regions of Estonia. Among young people there were merely 5% of respondents who could not speak or understand Estonian while 83% evaluated their Estonian to be very good or good. By 2011 the levels of knowledge of Estonian have become more balanced among different age groups – middle-age non-native speakers’ knowledge is similar to those of young people.

Regionally, in 2005 the lowest levels of Estonian were in Narva and Sillamäe and the highest levels in other parts of Estonia apart from Tallinn and Harjumaa. Among the respondents from Narva and Sillamäe 66% could not speak or understand Estonian. The strategies of selection of language of communication vary between the regions: in Ida-Virumaa Russian is the language used upon first contact with a stranger, while in Tallinn Estonian and Russian can be used interchangeably and in other parts of Estonia first contact with a stranger is nearly always initiated in Estonian.

Thus, although in ten years the knowledge of Estonian among non-native speakers in general has improved, it is probably not as fast as has been expected by the Estonian majority. Monitoring surveys show that knowledge of Estonian differs among people of different citizenship statuses, age groups and regional locations. The lowest level is among elderly people living in Narva with Russian citizenship and the highest level among young people (up
to 29 years) with Estonian citizenship living in other parts of Estonia apart from Ida-Virumaa and Harjumaa. Monitoring studies also show that by 2011 the group of people that does not speak or understand Estonian is composed solely of people with undetermined citizenship or Russian Federation citizenship. Furthermore there has been no significant improvement in the knowledge of Estonian among these groups within ten years. This situation may contribute to the low naturalisation levels among these groups of the population as well as exclusion from political life and low levels of civic participation.

Monitoring surveys shed some light on the opportunities for non-native speakers to learn Estonian as well as their motivation to do so. In 2000 the monitoring survey showed that non-native speakers with Estonian citizenship have most actively developed their knowledge of Estonian where every tenth respondent had paid for private language courses. This active approach to language learning is also reflected in the language knowledge where this group has the best knowledge of Estonian among Russian-speakers (see chapter above). Comparatively more than 2/3 of Russian citizens and half of people with undetermined citizenship have not studied Estonian since 1991. Unfortunately participation in language courses has not been monitored regularly and only data for 2000 is available.

In 2002 motivation to learn Estonian among people with undetermined citizenship was monitored. Based on the survey results respondents were divided into different groups among which the most numerous was the group labelled as “resigned from language learning” (54% of people with undetermined citizenship). Based on population census (2011) results this group could consist of around 45 600 people. The main motivation to learn Estonian has been the need to use the language at work (61% of respondents who work stated that in 2000). It has been stronger motivator than the need to acquire the language for naturalisation purposes. However, people with undetermined citizenship and Russian citizens work mainly at jobs where the majority of colleagues are Russian-speakers.

In 2008 66% of non-Estonian respondents stated that they needed Estonian to fulfil their work duties or use it outside of work. Only 9% of respondents agreed that one encounters no difficulties if one uses only Russian in Estonia and 12% stated that they do not see a reason for learning Estonian. Every third respondent agreed that knowledge of Estonian is not necessary. Thus by 2008 the symbolic value of Estonian has decreased among non-native speakers, which can be partly explained with the Bronze Soldier crisis in 2007. A survey carried out right after the crisis showed that Russian-speakers had become much more pessimistic about the prospects of successful integration and therefore have become more negative about learning Estonian (Saar Poll 2008).

In addition to the role of Estonian as a common language of communication the role of other (potential common) languages in the public sphere is equally important. Therefore monitoring studies have looked into the knowledge of Russian among native Estonian-speakers as well as knowledge of foreign languages (other than Estonian and Russian) among the whole population.
The 2000 monitoring round showed that Estonians know foreign languages better than Russian-speakers: 39% of Estonians and 61% of Russian-speakers did not know any other language (apart from Estonian and Russian). The same results were monitored eight years later in 2008. Among foreign languages English is the most popular, followed by Finnish and German. 41% of Estonians and 27% of Russian-speakers claimed they could speak and understand English in 2000; similar results were repeated in the 2008 monitoring study.

In 2002 76% of Estonians claimed they could speak Russian very well or well. In addition 21% claimed they could communicate in Russian a little. However, while in 2002 69% of young Estonians (age 30 and below) claimed they could speak Russian, by 2011 the share had dropped to 22%. Throughout more than ten years the knowledge of Russian has decreased in nearly all age groups among the Estonian population.

The 2011 monitoring report concludes that English is the language that different population groups feel most confident speaking and thus, a scenario can develop where the young generation will choose English over Estonian as a common language. In ten years the value of Estonian has increased on the labour market but the value of English has increased even more so. While in 2000 38% of non-native speakers agreed that they need Estonian for their work, in 2011 the share had increased to 49%. In 2000 the need to know English at work was acknowledged by 11% of Russian-speakers and in 2011 by 27%. In long-term perspective there could be a situation in Estonia where three languages – Estonian, Russian and English – will be used interchangeably as common languages.

**Integration in Education**

Education is acknowledged as one of the most important elements of integration as through the common education system a dominant cultural model is enforced and it is where the identity of young people develops. Almost all monitoring studies (2000, 2008, 2011) revealed that there is a tendency where Russian-speaking youth prefer to continue their education in vocational schools while their Estonian counterparts prefer academic education in universities. Several factors play their role here such as children tending to repeat the educational paths of their parents – among Estonian as well as Russian-speaking respondents parents preferred their children to acquire the same education as theirs. Since Russian-speaking parents have more often than not vocational and technical higher education, they preferred their children to follow the same paths. Secondly, giving preference to vocational education can simply be caused by the wider availability of Russian language programmes in vocational strand compared to universities.

However, it must be noted here that among Russian-speaking young people with Estonian citizenship there is the highest proportion of those who continue their education in universities, closely followed by ethnic Estonians. People with undetermined citizenship and Russian citizens predominantly have primary education while in elementary education there are no major differences among the groups.

The 2000 monitoring round pointed to the mismatch among Russian-speaking respondents between the acquired education and the qualifications required for the job a person is doing.
Estonian unskilled and ‘blue collar’ workers more often have lower educational qualifications than their Russian-speaking colleagues. The same tendency was observed in the service sector, as well as among specialists and managerial level jobs.

The 2008 and 2011 monitoring surveys revealed that a majority of Estonian respondents considered the opportunities to acquire higher education equal to all people in Estonia while only a quarter of Russian-speaking respondents agreed with this. Russian-speaking respondents saw the biggest inequality in access to higher education: more than half (54%) of Russian-speaking respondents stated that access to higher education is more limited to Russian youth compared to Estonian youth. The biggest obstacles to higher education for Russian-speakers were inadequate knowledge of Estonian and a limited choice for higher education programmes in Russian. In 2008 only 10% of university students studied in Russian while more than a third of Russian-speaking respondents would like to study in Russian. Thus the demand for Russian-language higher education was bigger than the availability. Alternatively a larger share of Russian school graduates continued their education in private universities (72%) compared to their Estonian counterparts (14.6%).

In the 2008 survey more than 65% and in 2011 80% of Russian-speaking respondents stated that teaching Estonian should be started in nursery school (three-fourths of Estonians agreed with this too). Among the rest of the respondents, a majority preferred Estonian language teaching starting in elementary school.

The 2005 monitoring survey analysed the attitudes and opinions about the reform of Russian-language secondary schools that was planned to start in 2007. The reform foresaw the gradual transformation of certain subjects at school from Russian to Estonian as the language of instruction. By the end of the transformation in 2011, there should have been 60% of the subjects taught in Estonian. In 2005 a majority of Russian-speaking respondents held negative attitudes towards the reform and had limited information about the reform process. However, the existing system of teaching in Russian-language secondary schools was supported only by less than a fifth of respondents. The reasons behind the negative attitudes were related to the unknown outcomes of the reform – a majority of Russian-speaking respondents were afraid that studying in Estonian might interfere with their identity as ethnic Russians and decrease their knowledge of Russian. Negative attitudes towards the reform did not phase out by the next round of monitoring in 2008. In 2008 half of Russian-speaking respondents stated that the transformation to Estonian as the language of instruction would result in lower exam grades and thus worsening of the opportunities to continue their education. Based on the study carried out in 2009 the first choice of school among Russian-speaking respondents was Russian-language school (32%) followed by language immersion classes (25%) and then Estonian-language school (23%) (Masso & Kello: 2009). The higher the educational level of a respondent was the less there was a wish to acquire higher education in Russian.
Integration in the Labour Market

Unemployment, the spread of extreme forms of poverty, exclusion caused by residence in disadvantaged regions of former industrial production, lack of knowledge of state language and mismatch between education and the needs of the labour market are the problems that plagued Russian-speakers’ integration into the labour market throughout the 1990s as well as the beginning of the new millennium.

Unemployment has been higher among Russian-speakers since the beginning of the operation of the market economy. In 2001 there were 83,000 people unemployed in Estonia – among them 38,000 or 46% were Russian-speakers who exceeded their share among the working population. While among Estonians the main reasons for unemployment were related to lack of education, among Russian-speakers the main reason was lack of knowledge of Estonian. By 2008 the gap between unemployment of Russian-speakers and Estonians had increased further – while in 2001 the unemployment (of working age population aged 15-74) of Russian-speakers was 1.6 times higher than that of Estonians, in the years 2004-2006 it increased to 2.4 times. By 2007 it decreased to 1.9 times. In 2010 at the peak of the economic recession Estonians remained largely employed while Russian-speakers had moved from employment to unemployment. Unemployment of Russian-speakers was 15.7% in the III quarter of 2011 while the unemployment of Estonians was 8.6%.

However, at the same time, the positive attitude towards finding a job in Estonia has gradually increased among Russian-speakers from 49% in 2001 to 73% in 2008. By 2011 there has been a decrease again where only half (52%) of Russian-speakers considered their opportunities to find a job in Estonia good. The 2002 monitoring round revealed that there was higher interest among Russian-speakers to emigrate for work compared to Estonians.

The former industrial region Ida-Virumaa has had the highest unemployment rates throughout the 20 years of independence. The employment opportunities of Ida-Virumaa’s urban residents are limited or lack in total. The two times’ higher unemployment rate in the towns around the region keeps the overall unemployment numbers of Russian-speakers high. Thus, more often than not, the unemployment of Russian-speakers is not caused so much by a lack of knowledge of Estonian as by the residence in the distressed area of Ida-Virumaa. Furthermore, differently from Estonians, Russian-speakers are less mobile – while in the 2005 monitoring study every tenth Estonian had moved to other place of residence, only 3% of Russian-speakers had done so. Similarly there were fewer Russian-speakers ready to establish their own business compared to Estonian respondents.

Traditionally Russian-speakers continue to be employed in industry: in 2000 29% among Russian-speakers compared to 11% among Estonians were employed in industry. However, the labour needs of that economic sector are continuously decreasing. Large parts of Russian-speakers who have lost their jobs in industry have moved to services and commerce. There are equal shares of unskilled workers among Estonians and Russian-speakers while there are proportionally more skilled workers among Russian-speakers than Estonians (35% compared to 22%). However, there are more high-ranking specialists or top managers among Estonians.
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(31% among Estonians against 21% among Russian-speakers) while there are equal shares of middle-level managers in both groups.

Throughout the last decade employment in different economic sectors has remained the same, although it is not advantageous for integration. 60% of Russian-speakers work in unskilled or semi-skilled positions and only 40% in middle or higher managerial or skilled positions. While there are more people with higher technical or university degrees among working age Russian-speakers compared to Estonians, their employment positions do not reflect their educational levels.

In the 2005 monitoring round there was a noticeable move of Russian-speakers from services and commerce to real estate and banking sectors. However, middle-aged Russian-speaking women usually do low paid jobs in commerce such as cashiers and supermarket service that are not highly valued subjectively. Job preferences of young Russian-speakers are similar to those of young Estonians – they wish to be employed as specialists or in public sector jobs where Estonians are currently in a disproportional majority.

The 2011 monitoring round revealed that economic crisis hit the employment sectors where Russian-speakers were a majority of workforce hard such as unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in construction and commerce. 65% of people employed in those jobs were Russian-speakers. Russian-speaking men were in most disadvantaged position among whom 35% became unemployed at the peak of the crisis.

In 2002 incomes did not differ between Estonians and Russian-speakers in the lower income sections; however, the upper part of the scale was more problematic from an integration point of view: there were more Estonians among high-income earners. At the same time income gaps within the Russian-speaking population were smaller than within the ethnic Estonian population.

The 2008 monitoring survey points to the continuous increase in net incomes of the Estonian population. In the years 1994-2006 average incomes increased by nearly eight times. At the same time the average income of Russian-speakers had been lower than that of ethnic Estonians throughout the whole period (depending on the year Russian-speakers earned 80-85% of the total income of all ethnic Estonians), whereby during the years 1993-2003 income differences of ethnic groups increased, but during the years 2004-2005 decreased. The lower income of Russian-speakers was mainly the result of little share among the top-earners group.

In 2000 there were more Russian-speakers’ families than ethnic Estonians among the poor based on the income; however, the absolute poor were mainly rural ethnic Estonians. Young Russian-speakers with good education and Estonian citizenship were similar to ethnic Estonians in their incomes. Dominantly retired people with Russian citizenship (60% of them were 55 years and older), with lower education and people with undetermined citizenship identified themselves as poor.

By 2005 the share of extremely poor families had decreased among all population groups and among Russian-speakers there had been an increase of the families who have savings. The specific problem appeared to be regional differences where Russian-speakers living in Ida-
Virumaa and Tallinn had lower incomes than ethnic Estonians. As in 2000, the 2005 monitoring revealed that incomes of Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship were higher than those of other citizenships.

Ethnic Estonians and Russian-speakers perceived the equal opportunities in the labour market differently – in 2002 51% of Russian-speakers and 17% of ethnic Estonians agreed that Russian-speakers have a higher propensity to become unemployed. Similarly in 2008 half of ethnic Estonians considered the opportunities to find a job equal for all ethnic groups in Estonia while half of Russian-speakers considered ethnic Estonians’ opportunities to be much better. Chances to get a managerial job in governmental or local authorities were considered higher for ethnic Estonians by Estonians themselves; however, the latter were less resolute in this question than Russian-speaking respondents.

In 2008 2/3 of ethnic Estonians had no previous experience with unequal treatment in the labour market. Among Russian-speakers the share was 1/5 while ¼ considered unequal treatment to be regularly happening. The 2008 monitoring points to the so-called glass-ceiling effect for Russian-speakers in the Estonian labour market – for Russian-speakers with good knowledge of Estonian and with Estonian citizenship there is 1.4 times less likelihood of reaching the same position as for ethnic Estonians with the same characteristics. Despite objective success and better resources, Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship shared in large part with their ethnic pairs negative emotions and disappointment, including distrust and alienation. They were equally critical of the equal opportunities in the economy and politics. These results point to the emergence of an elite among Russian-speakers who share the rather critical world-view towards the Estonian state of their co-ethnics who, however, themselves are well established economically and are socially active. Their exclusion from political and public life has become an ever-larger problem as it undermines their expectations of inclusion and feeds the protest identity that has been taking shape during the last decade.

The 2008 monitoring also points out that there is quite a big and active group of Russian-speakers who are well-adjusted to the market economy and business-minded and who are citizens of the Russian Federation. Keeping Russian citizenship would provide them freedom of movement and business without being ‘a suspicious foreigner’.

**Citizenship and Political Integration**

During the first years of the newly independent Estonian state the Russian-speaking population was in a precarious situation concerning their legal and political standing. In 2000, however, their subjective readiness to integrate legally and politically was evaluated as high – 86% of respondents agreed that it is important to acquire Estonian citizenship because they want to secure their lives in Estonia and 70% added that through naturalisation they wish to secure the future of their children in Estonia. The main reason why they have not naturalised yet was lack of knowledge of Estonian (67%); many also hold the opinion that naturalisation rules are not dignifying.
Although a large majority of Russian-speakers wished to have Estonian citizenship either for themselves or their family members, only 16% of them (43% among young people) planned to take steps towards naturalisation in 2005. Thus, there was quite a strong wish to naturalise; however, readiness to take steps towards it was rather low. By 2008 the wish to naturalise had significantly decreased. While in 2005 74% of Russian-speaking respondents wanted to acquire Estonian citizenship, by 2008 the share had decreased to slightly above half (51%). By 2011 the share increased again by a small margin (64%). Other preferences of people with undetermined citizenship in 2008 were as follows: 19% wanted Russian citizenship, 14% the citizenship of some other country and 16% did not want to change their legal status. In the previous years 2000-2005 only 5-6% of respondents were interested in acquiring Russian citizenship, but by 2005 the share had increased to 11%. Practical reasons as well as Bronze Soldier crisis of 2007 had influenced the naturalisation motivation of Russian-speakers. 23% of respondents stated that visa-free movement between the EU and Russia was the reason for not acquiring Estonian citizenship and a further 19% stated that statelessness did not interfere with their lives in Estonia.

According to the 2008 monitoring a majority of respondents stated that their inability to master Estonian and pass the citizenship test was the main obstacle. Although a majority of Estonians considered acquisition of Russian citizenship by Russian-speakers to be an act of patriotism and statement of political views, a majority of Russian-speakers themselves considered this to be a pragmatic choice stemming from the problem of not being able to meet the naturalisation requirements for Estonian citizenship or having more freedom of movement and conducting business with Russia. The 2011 monitoring study confirmed the pragmatic attitude towards the citizenship question among the Russian-speaking population.

The 2008 monitoring survey pointed out that the segregation of the Russian-speaking population into three different legal categories – Estonian citizens, Russian citizens and people with undetermined citizenship – was not accidental, and reflects different adaptation strategies and adjustment levels towards the norms, constraints and opportunities in Estonian society. Successful integration of Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship is a result of interplay of their human resources and social factors. It means that Estonian citizenship has operated as an accelerator of ‘natural choice’ by giving even more opportunities to the more able and impedes the opportunities of those who are not so adept.

Opinions of ethnic Estonians and Russian-speakers about the citizenship policy of the post-independent Estonian state differ a lot and the difference has not decreased over time.
The opinions of different population groups about alleviating naturalisation requirements were asked in the 2000, 2005 and 2008 monitoring surveys. Ethnic Estonians and Russian-speakers alike focused mainly on knowledge of Estonian although with different approaches. According to Russian-speakers everything would improve once the language requirements were removed, whereas Estonians did not agree. In 2005 10% of ethnic Estonian respondents did not agree to give citizenship through simplified procedure while 57% agreed to concede one or two criteria. Throughout the years opinions have not changed and in 2008 the same results were observed. Only the opinion about the naturalisation of people born in Estonia has changed: in 2008 46% of Estonians supported the idea of giving citizenship to this group of people, which was slightly less than in the previous monitoring round in 2005 but still higher than in 2000. Equally 46% of Estonians supported the idea of giving citizenship in simplified procedure to family members of Estonian citizens by birth.

The active participation in political and social life of all people living in Estonia irrespective of their ethnicity, language and culture has been set as a priority in the Estonian integration policy. However, the data show that the Russian-speaking population is underrepresented in exercising power compared to their share in the total population. In 2002 Russian-speakers, those with citizenship and without, were underrepresented practically on all political levels: they made up 30% of the electorate in local elections; however, among local elected politicians they constituted only 9%; among the electorate in national elections they were 10% while in the parliament only 6% of members came from the Russian-speaking community.

The 2005 monitoring study revealed that the activity of citizens of different ethnic backgrounds did not differ: according to their own statements 17% of ethnic Estonians and 15% of Russian-speakers were actively involved in political life. However, people with undetermined citizenship felt nearly excluded from political activities – according to their own statements 77% of them did not feel involved and 22% minimally involved. It applies similarly to Russian citizens among whom as much as 81% did not feel involved and 10% minimally involved.

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**Table 1. Opinions about citizenship policy 2000-2008 (share of those who agree with the statement, %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship policy is harsh and violates human rights</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian-speakers</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Estonians</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship policy meets all international standards</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian-speakers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Estonians</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In mid-2000 a new concept of state identity (riigiidentiteet) was introduced in the Estonian integration policy. It appeared for the first time in the 2008 monitoring survey and was defined as a collective “us” feeling that is characterised by a positive emphasis on belonging to the Estonian nation/state and sharing its core values and symbols. To measure this sense of belonging a state identity index was constructed. The index was composed of three components: agreement or disagreement with statements such as: 1) “Nowhere in the world do I feel so much at home as in Estonia”; and 2) “I feel proud when I see the Estonian flag”, that measure a person’s emotional connection to the Estonian state and its symbols; the third component was a reply to a question, 3) “How important in your opinion is it to require the Russian-speaking population to know Estonian?” that would show a respondent’s disposition towards one of the main core values of the Estonian state as declared in the constitution and that is key in the successful integration process.

To measure state identity a 7-point scale from 0 to 6 was used where the highest value represented the strongest identification with the Estonian state. 41% of Russian-speaking respondents with Estonian citizenship belonged to the group of weak or rather weak state identity while 76% belonged to a group with strong state identity. As could be expected people born in Estonia and holding Estonian citizenship had somewhat stronger state identity than those born outside Estonia or without citizenship. A large majority of those who did not wish to naturalise also had weak state identity (79% of those); among those who would like to receive Estonian citizenship 42% still had emotional connection to the Estonian state that was rather weak.

The Bronze Soldier crisis in 2007 that evolved largely around questions of the interpretation of certain historical events brought the attention of researchers to the question of historical memory. Thus in 2008 monitoring survey questions about history were included for the first time. Consequently, 69% of respondents considered questions of the Second World War and the occupation of Estonia as disturbing for interethnic relations. Surprisingly young ethnic Estonians were more disturbed by these questions than older generations.

The 2011 monitoring survey confirmed that Russian-speakers’ trust in the Estonian state and the attitudes of ethnic Estonians towards the Russian-speaking population was strongly affected by the experience of the Bronze Soldier crisis. Both population groups agreed that the crisis increased Russian-speakers’ mistrust in the Estonian state. Nevertheless, the authors of the 2011 monitoring survey insert some optimism by stating that the Bronze Soldier crisis can still as a negative lesson in interethnic relations insert a positive effect on integration by creating more stability and security.

**Integration Clusters 2011 (Lauristin)**

The 2011 monitoring survey was the first one where so-called ‘integration clusters’ (lõimklastrid) were composed. They are important to be described here as they provide a concise overview of the integration process among the Russian-speaking population.
Integration clusters are based on three dimensions of integration that constitute different values of the index: linguistic, political and social integration dimensions. By combining three dimensions of the index through the cluster analysis five integration clusters are formed. These five clusters describe different stages of integration of the Russian-speaking minority and different dimensions of integration. The clusters are as follows:

Cluster A – 21% of Russian-speakers – represent people who are strongly integrated in all dimensions;

Cluster B – 16% of Russian-speakers – have strong civic integration but weaker linguistic integration;

Cluster C – 13% of Russian-speakers – have strong linguistic integration but weak civic integration;

Cluster D – 29% of Russian-speakers – are weakly integrated, mainly people with undetermined citizenship, have poor Estonian language skills and participate mainly in local life;

Cluster E – 22% of Russian-speakers – includes people who are not integrated, mainly Russian citizens of the older age group.

Compared to 2008 when the integration clusters were researched for the first time (under a different research project though), the overall share of well integrated and badly integrated remains largely unchanged.

Combination of the index values brings out big risks from the point of view of the interethnic relations, integration process and security of the Estonian state. There is a significantly large group of people under formation that regenerates itself and that is not satisfied with its socio-economic situation, and is alienated from the Estonian state, does not speak Estonian, is passive and distrustful, and lives mainly in Ida-Virumaa, as well as in Tallinn. Most importantly, in addition to the older generation, which constitutes the majority of the group, there is a significant share of young people with poor Estonian skills and fewer prospective career opportunities among them. Although this group (clusters D and E) is quite passive, it could become a breeding ground for manipulation and anti-Estonian state propaganda at moments of social unrest.

Media and Integration

The media influence a person’s worldview and giving preference to one or another information source influences and shapes a person’s attitudes and values. Similarly, access to information can be a decisive factor in the person’s ability to participate and be included. The influence of media on integration as well as access to information was researched in the 2008 and 2011 monitoring surveys.

In 2008 a majority of Russian-speakers agreed that there was a need to provide wider access to information in Russian in Estonia, especially in areas where it was not yet common such as social services and social benefits, adopted legal acts, state institutions’ and local authorities’ websites and administrative forms. A majority of ethnic Estonian respondents were not
against the wider use of Russian in those instances, however preferring the answer “occasionally” and “in certain circumstances”. A quarter of Estonians agreed that there was certainly a need for Russian-language information; around 11-19% were against any circumstances to provide information in Russian as well. Ethnic Estonian respondents generally agreed that making information available in Russian in medical products is necessary.

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From the first monitoring survey (2000) it emerged that information produced in Russia was the main factor forming the mentality and identity of a majority of Russian-speakers in Estonia. In 2005 30% of Russian-speakers regularly followed Estonian TV and radio channels, while 69% followed Russian programmes on Estonian TV and radio stations. At the same time Russian TV channels were watched by nearly all Russian-speakers.

In 2008 media channels were segregated into four categories based on declared follower numbers in the survey. The media channels that were followed by 90% of all respondents and 50% of those followed them every day were categorised as channels that have a very big influence. Such media channels were for ethnic Estonians all three TV channels (ETV, Kanal2, TV3), as well as Estonian-language radio channels; among the Russian-speaking population PBK and other Russian TV channels.

The media channels that were followed by the half of all respondents were categorised as having quite a big influence. Among ethnic Estonians such channels were Internet portals and for Russian-speakers Russian-language Internet portals. In addition, for Russian-speakers global news channels such as Euronews, BBC and CNN (and ETV) had a big influence. Russian-speakers also favoured global news channels in the 2011 monitoring study.

The media channels that were followed between a third and a fifth of all respondents were categorised as channels with little influence. Among Estonians such channels were global news channels, Russian and Finnish TV channels and English-language Internet portals. Among Russian-speaking populations such channels were Estonian-language radio channels, TV channels Kanal2 and TV3, as well as Estonian and English-language Internet portals.

The media channels that were followed by less than a tenth of all respondents were categorised as having very little influence. Such channels were among ethnic Estonians Russian-language radio channels and Internet portals; for Russian-speakers Finnish and German TV channels.

Similarly in the 2011 survey the main media channel for Russian-speakers in Estonia was PBK, which was followed on a daily basis or several times a week by 81.8% of respondents. Among ethnic Estonians the Estonian-language TV channels ETV, Kanal2 and TV3 had the biggest influence as they were followed on a daily basis by 86% of respondents. The most popular newspaper was among ethnic Estonians the Postimees, followed by local newspapers (regular readers 45.9% and 45.6%, respectively). For Russian-speakers the most popular newspapers were local Russian-language newspapers (19.7%) followed closely by the Russian-language Postimees (19.1%).
In the 2008 monitoring survey, under the fresh influence of the Bronze Soldier crisis of 2007, there was high mistrust in Estonian-language media among Russian-speakers. Only 18% of respondents trusted Estonian-language media while 49% did not trust it. Similarly the mistrust of ethnic Estonian respondents in Russian media was high: 40% of all ethnic Estonians considered Russian channels as untrustworthy. Surprisingly a majority of Russian-speakers in Estonia did not consider the Russian media’s coverage of the Bronze Soldier crisis adequate or trustworthy (Saar Poll 2007); however, by 2008 trust had been restored and a majority of Russian-speakers considered Russian media channels to be trusted in their coverage of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008.

Compared to 2008, in 2011 there had been an increase in popularity of Estonian media channels and the trust in them among Russian-speakers: in 2008 37% of Russian-speakers followed Estonian channels regularly and 27% considered them to be trustworthy; by 2011 nearly half of Russian-speakers followed the Estonian media (TV, radio, newspapers and Internet portals) and around a third trusted them. PBK was the most trustworthy media channel among Russian-speakers in 2011, closely followed by Estonian Russian-language programmes and in turn followed by Estonian Russian-language newspapers and Radio 4. Other Russian channels were trusted by 53% of Russian-speaking respondents and as much as 30% did not trust them. Thus the 2011 monitoring did not confirm the widespread understanding that Russian-speakers trust information coming from the Russian media without reservations.

Among young Russian-speakers the popularity of the Estonian-language media and trust in it were both high. 57% of young Russian-speakers follow Estonian-language Internet portals (49% trusted them), 52% TV programmes (40% trusted them), and 46% newspapers (43% trusted them).

**Regional Differences in Integration: Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa**

Regional differences in integration were in focus in the latest integration monitoring in 2011. In previous monitoring rounds it was possible to discern data from different regions; however, no special attention was paid to regional specifics.

The 2011 monitoring survey showed that the weakest identification with the Estonian state and nation was among Russian-speakers in Ida-Virumaa: almost every second Russian-speaking respondent from Ida-Virumaa did not consider herself or himself to be part of the Estonian nation. Additionally residents of Ida-Virumaa more than others considered Russia to be their homeland while Russian-speakers in Tallinn had a more cosmopolitan sense of homeland. The biggest share of Russian-speakers irrespective of their citizenship, who considered Estonia to be their homeland and who identified themselves with the Estonian nation, lived in other parts of Estonia (outside Harjumaa and Ida-Virumaa).

The integration cluster index (see page 18 above) showed that Ida-Virumaa residents are among the least integrated, especially residents of the Kohtla-Järve and Sillamäe areas. There
were fewer differences between different regions of Tallinn. Again, Russian-speakers residing in other parts of Estonia were the most integrated.

36% of Ida-Virumaa respondents claimed that they did not know Estonian well enough in order to follow the Estonian-language media. In Tallinn the respective figure was 17%. Thus, for 31% of respondents from Ida-Virumaa Estonian-language channels play no role in providing information (for 39% of Narva residents) while for Russian-speakers residing in other parts of Estonia these channels were the main source of information (and not so much Russian-language Estonian TV programmes). Trust in media channels differed a lot between the Russian-speaking residents of different regions: the biggest share of those who trust the Estonian media live in Maardu and the Lasnamäe region (39% said they trust the Estonian media) and the smallest share in Ida-Virumaa (10% said they trust it). 16% of Ida-Virumaa residents considered themselves to be badly informed about news in Estonia.

Readiness to emigrate temporarily or permanently equally characterised ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking population and was thus a characteristic of an economically unstable society rather than specific to one ethnic group. According to Statistics Estonia the largest emigration had taken place from Ida-Virumaa where the net migration balance was -8000 persons during the 2000-2008 period. Since these were the years of the economic boom, it can be assumed that emigration took place to Tallinn and Harjumaa, which was the main centre of the boom and labour migration.

In sum, analysis of regional differences brings out tendencies that could have already been discerned from earlier monitoring surveys – Russian-speaking residents of Ida-Virumaa were among the least integrated, feel alienated from the Estonian state and nation, had the smallest share of people who could speak Estonian and trusted Estonian media channels the least. The biggest share of integrated Russian-speakers lives in other parts of Estonia outside of Harjumaa and Ida-Virumaa. Integration monitoring pointed clearly to the need to develop special integration measures for Ida-Virumaa.

**New Immigrants**

The definition of new immigrants refers to foreign labour and their family members, asylum-seekers and refugees who have migrated to Estonia after re-independence in 1991. Although the annual number of arrivals is very small, Estonia can be still considered an immigration country. Stemming from this, the last monitoring survey (2011) paid special attention to the integration problems of new immigrants.

On one hand, Estonians consider immigration to be unavoidable and natural – the Estonian population is ageing and Estonian society is seen as open to people from other cultures. On the other hand, ethnic Estonians admit that there is already a very large share of foreigners living in Estonia and thus they do not feel the obligation to welcome any new immigrants. Compared to Estonians Russian-speakers are somewhat more open to the arrival of new immigrants, especially residents of Ida-Virumaa. The largest difference is in the question of
receiving refugees – 40% of Russian-speakers and only 20% of ethnic Estonians are positive about the arrival of refugees.

People who have arrived in Estonia within the last 20 years have mainly settled in larger cities or around them: 51% of immigrants live in Tallinn and in the surrounding areas. A large majority – ca. 70% – are persons in their best working age, while children under the age of 14 make up only 13% of all immigrants. Residence permit statistics show that the main reason for immigrating to Estonia is work (54%), family reasons (30%) and studies (13%). A majority of labour immigrants are not interested in integrating since they are here with short-term contracts and they plan to return to their home countries once the contracts expire. Integration becomes relevant when the contracts are extended or they apply for permanent residence permits and plan to stay in Estonia for longer periods.

Focus group discussions with new immigrants revealed that the ability to integrate and feel included depends very much on a person’s background. People from Russia and other former Soviet republics have fewer integration barriers due to the common history, already existing local community and to some extent knowledge of Russian. For Europeans and African and Asian immigrants first contact with Estonian life often results in culture shock. Once the first emotions – elation and euphoria – subside, a feeling of isolation follows, especially for immigrants with families. Some participants in the focus group discussion were rather critical of the Estonian social support system by expressing opinions such as “the state cares little about its people”.

It was acknowledged by all immigrants that the main factor that facilitates integration is knowledge of Estonian and a majority of the respondents were motivated to learn it. Lack of knowledge of the language hinders the integration process from the very beginning when starting to look for a job – one can’t get information, can’t communicate or understand the communication. However, at the same time learning Estonian has not been made easy. There is no adequate information about language courses on state institutions’ websites, when contacting officials there is no readiness to provide enough information and solve the problems of language-learning. According to the participants in the focus group there are no Estonian classes taught in English sponsored by the state.

Immigrants have not encountered prejudice from employers, and human resources managers as well as consultants for unemployed people confirmed this. Immigrants did not refer to any kind of instances of discrimination in Estonia.

In sum, the integration of new immigrants does not stand high on the priority list of political debates. The need for immigrant labour has not been forecast or analysed, there are no labour migration agreements with other countries and instead the return of expatriate Estonians is set as a political priority. The same labour market integration measures are provided to new immigrants as to Estonian citizens with no special focus on the former’s specific problems such as lack of information in English or lack of opportunities for learning Estonian.
Bibliography


